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The use of force by the police and other law enforcement 
officers has long been a significant topic of concern, 
especially when it results in death. This issue and the 
controversies around it have recently been highlighted by  
a series of high-profile deaths in 2020.  
Police Lethal Force and Accountability assesses the frequency 
of deaths, and the availability and reliability of information 
regarding deaths, associated with the application of force 
by law enforcement agencies in four jurisdictions: Belgium, 
England & Wales, France and the Netherlands.
By adopting a common set of considerations for 
assessing the policies and practices within these individual 
jurisdictions, this report enables comparisons to be 
made across them. In doing so, we look to provide those 
in policing agencies, campaigning groups, government 
ministries and others, with sound information with which 
they can identify priorities to ensure uses of force are being 
accurately recorded and investigated. By enabling those 
concerned to understand how uses of force are recorded 
and addressed in comparison with other jurisdictions, we 
hope this report will help them to build a stronger case 
when holding public institutions accountable and identifying 
points for improvement.
As documented, while deaths from the use of force 
appear relatively rare across these four jurisdictions when 
compared to countries such as the US1, the procedures 
1 In the US, roughly 1,110 police killings have taken place annually over recent years, see https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/nationaltrends, 
(accessed 4 December 2020).   
and policies for recording, investigating and disclosing 
details associated with deaths are wanting. The availability 
of official information on the number of deaths associated 
with the use of force, its reliability, and the extent of details 
collected on those that die at the hands of the state vary 
from country to country. While there are elements of 
good practice, the procedures and policies are often lacking 
in critical respects. As a result of such deficiencies, it is 
difficult to assess many important dimensions of policing, 
including whether some communities are disproportionality 
subjected to the lethal use of force.  
Ultimately, reducing the extent of police force requires 
addressing underlying societal conditions associated with 
employment, health, housing and education. However, 
more can be done by law enforcement agencies, as well 
as by their oversight bodies and government ministers. 
Assembling data and evidence that is accessible, relevant 
and useful to those concerned with lethal force is a 
necessary step to enhance accountability for, and possibly 
prevent, deaths. In the context of democratic societies, 
the police and police-related bodies not only need to act 
on what they know in order to learn lessons, but also to 
demonstrate they are doing so to the populations they 
are meant to serve. Every death associated with the use 
of force by law enforcement officials should be recorded, 
recognised and investigated. No one’s death should go 
unacknowledged and unexamined. 
Our overall conclusion is that the agencies considered in this report, in Belgium, England 
& Wales, France and the Netherlands, all need to enhance data collection, publication 
and analysis of deaths following the use of force in their respective systems. Further, they 
need to act upon lessons from previous experiences, so as to help prevent future deaths 
and ensure different communities are not disproportionality subjected to the lethal use  
of force.
As the detailed findings of this report demonstrate, it is 
apparent that while each of the jurisdictions discussed 
has some data recording and accountability processes in 
place for their law enforcement agencies, when considered 
comparatively there are notable disparities among them,  
and some processes are incomplete and imprecise. The key 
points to note are that:
•  Data collection and publication is a common concern in 
all four jurisdictions. Belgium, England & Wales and the 
Netherlands have developed fairly detailed reporting and 
data recording processes for deaths relating to police uses 
of force, but each could enhance these through simple 
steps. For instance, in Belgium there is scope for better 
information sharing and coordination among agencies. In 
England & Wales, multiple systems are in place and there 
is a need to enhance the accessibility and navigability of 
data, and to compile data from additional sources, such 
as inquests and court cases. In the Netherlands there is 
scope for an enhanced level of detail in data collected and 
improved public availability. France has the most serious 
need for improvement, due to its systematic lack of a 
rigorous approach to data collection and publication across 
both of its two main national law enforcement agencies, 
the National Police and National Gendarmerie. Although 
progress has been made by the National Police, which now 
publishes the number of “injuries and deaths” it registers 
each year, these data are partial and lack precision. For  
its part, the National Gendarmerie does not publish any 
data on the number of people injured or killed during  
its operations. 
•  Data quality similarly raises concerns in all four systems, 
albeit to different degrees. In Belgium, the Netherlands and 
England & Wales (where two different systems operate),  
the main need is to clarify the requirement for recording 
data on deaths to achieve greater thoroughness and 
consistency. In France, the principal concern is the lack  
of precision about the methodology used by the National 
Police in its data recording, and the absence of such data for 
the Gendarmerie. All four jurisdictions need to consider and 
where necessary enhance their recording and publishing of 
demographic data so that the impact of the use of force on 
different communities can be monitored effectively. 
•  Data analysis and the scope for learning lessons from 
incidents of fatalities are the most serious concerns across 
the board. Whereas Belgium, England & Wales and the 
Netherlands have some processes in place for learning  
from past deaths and adjusting strategies and policies, the 
extent to which this happens in practice is questionable 
and each still has room for improvement. Law enforcement 
agencies in France need to introduce appropriate policies 
and processes in the first place and conduct analysis  
to generate evidence-based recommendations and to  
prevent future deaths.
•  Independence and impartiality in the investigation of deaths 
are inconsistent across these four jurisdictions. While 
all of them have some sort of apparently independent 
investigative bodies for examining police uses of force, in 
Belgium and France the degree of independence raises 
questions due to ongoing investigative reliance on the 
personnel and systems of their law enforcement agencies, 
which raises concern about the degree of practical 
independence in real terms.
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Are the number of deaths following any police use of force (be it firearms, ‘less lethal’ weapons or other force): 
Collected? P G G U P
Publicly available? L G G N P
Is this a legal requirement? P N N N N
Can such information be requested from the authorities 
via FOI laws?
P G N N G
If published, to what extent is the number of deaths 
readily identifiable from official statistics? What work 
needs to be done to pull these out?
L P G N P
Are the deceased identified by name? G P N N N
Is demographic and other information for the deceased (including ethnic background, age and gender):
Collected? P G U U N
Publicly available? N G N N N
Is this a legal requirement? N N N N N
Can such information be requested from the authorities 
via FOI laws?
L G N N N
Is demographic and other information for LEOs:
Collected? P G U U N
Publicly available? N N N N N
Is this a legal requirement? L N N N N
Can such information be requested from the authorities 
via FOI laws?
L G N N N
Is information about the type(s) of force used:
Collected? G G U U G
Publicly available? N G N N G
Is this a legal requirement? N N N N N
Can such information be requested from the authorities 
via FOI laws?









Data Quality of Official Sources
How reliable are the sources used to produce official 
statistics about deaths?
P P L N P
Internal quality assurance / verification conducted L G U N G
Methodology for data collection publicly specified  N G P N G
How reliable are the overall figures produced? P P P N P
Data Analysis and Lessons Learnt
State / police agencies analyse data to generate 
evidence-based recommendations / lessons learnt,  
in order to prevent future deaths
L P U U P
Evidence that state / police agencies act on the results 
of their analysis, including applying lessons learnt
P L N N P
External bodies are able to reuse data for their own 
analyses
P P N P
External, non-governmental agencies collect, and are 
able to publish, their own statistics on deaths following 
police use of force
P G G G G
Investigations by Official Agencies
Is there a legal requirement for deaths to be 
independently investigated?
G G N N G
How independent and impartial are the official 
investigations? 
P P N N G
Investigation reports into deaths are:
Publicly available? L P N N L
Do they give reasons for the conclusions they have 
reached?
U P N N G
Is this a legal requirement? N N N N N
Can such information be requested from the authorities 
via Freedom of Information laws?
L G N N G
Information available on legal proceedings against agents 
/ officials pursuant to deaths
N L N N P
Number of prosecutions against agents / officials 
involved in the last ten years? 










G L N UP
To illustrate these conclusions, Table 1 below provides a summary overview of the classifications made 
of key procedures, policies and practices in place to monitor, investigate and report lethal force by 
major law enforcement organisations in the four systems covered in this report. The categories and 
colour coding were developed on the basis of the process explained in the introduction to the Country 
Report section below. Further details are provided in the individual reports themselves.
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Participation (Permanent Centre for Citizenship 
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Introduction  
In democratic societies, good policing depends on public consent and an acceptance 
of the legitimacy of the police. As events around the globe in 2020 have made evident, 
consent and legitimacy can be eroded when force is seen as unnecessary or excessive. 
The killing of George Floyd on 25 May after his arrest in Minneapolis initiated 
extensive media coverage of the use of force in policing across Europe, North  
America and beyond.  
2 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials adopted by UN 
General Assembly Resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/lawenforcementofficials.aspx, 
(accessed 4 December 2020).
3 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials 
(1990). Note Principles 6, 11, 22, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/useofforceandfirearms.aspx, (accessed 4 December 2020).
4 UN Secretary-General. Extra-custodial Use of Force and the Prohibition of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment  
or Punishment /A/72/178, 2017: paragraph 70, http://undocs.org/A/72/178, (accessed 4 December 2020).
5 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Guidance on Less Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement HR/PUB/20/1, 2020, 
para 3.3 - 3.4, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/LLW_Guidance.pdf (accessed 4 December 2020).
6 N. Krieger et al., ‘Police Killings and Police Deaths Are Public Health Data and Can Be Counted’, PLoS Med, vol. 12, no. 12, 2015, e1001915, 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001915, (accessed 4 December 2020).
7 https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/series/counted-us-police-killings, (accessed 4 December 2020).
As well, the need to resort to force can be affected by 
the degree of support among the public. When the use 
of force results in death, and when members of certain 
communities disproportionately die at the hands of the 
state, then questions about the justifications for force 
become particularly pronounced. The finality of death, 
as well as its potentially traumatic toll for individuals and 
groups, raise vital and sensitive issues about bereavement, 
potential infringements of the most fundamental human 
right, the right to life, and the importance of learning 
lessons to prevent future deaths, where possible. 
The collection, recording and publicising of data about 
the use of force is a basic step toward ensuring the 
accountability of the police under the rule of law. 
International standards and principles, most notably the 
UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials2 and the 
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law 
Enforcement Officials3, task states to effectively report 
incidents of force, especially when they result in death. 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
has recommended that ‘States should establish effective 
systems for monitoring and reporting on the use of force, 
and relevant information should be made accessible to 
the public, including statistics on when, against whom and 
through which means force is used and on the resulting 
harm’4. The United Nations’ Guidance on Less Lethal 
Weapons in Law Enforcement notes that states should 
consider requiring ‘all law enforcement agencies  
to document every use of force involving less lethal 
weapons or related equipment... (and) should identify  
any lessons learned from the incident’5.
And yet, apart from high-profile cases that garner media 
attention, it is too often the case that little is known 
publicly about the situations in which the police use force, 
as well as how often such force leads to death. Although 
law enforcement agencies may keep records of incidents, 
access to such documentation can be restricted or difficult 
to obtain. This lack of information is in itself a sign of 
weak accountability. It raises serious questions about the 
compliance with international human rights standards 
and principles and is often incompatible with public 
expectations for the police. Beyond access to records, 
there is often a reluctance to identify (let alone address) 
patterns of discriminatory or disproportionate use of lethal 
force against vulnerable or marginalised groups. 
In the years prior to 2020, notable national efforts had 
been made to compile figures on the number of deaths 
following the use of force by law enforcement officials. 
In the US, for instance, the lack of reliable data on the 
number of persons killed by the police has been recognised 
for some time6. Based on initial work undertaken by  
The Guardian newspaper7, the campaigning group We the 
Protesters has assembled a wide-ranging database on deaths  
of people killed by the police in the US8.
Whilst there have been such initiatives focusing on  
deaths following police use of force within specific  
countries, relatively few efforts have been undertaken 
to compare deaths in the context of law enforcement 
across jurisdictions (examples include Chevigny9 and Osse 
& Cano10). This omission is surprising, as violence, which 
includes violence by law enforcement officials, is recognised 
internationally by a range of actors and texts – including  
the UN Secretary General11, the Geneva Declaration  
(signed by 100 countries12) and the World Health 
Organisation13 – as a key issue. In that light, international 
efforts have been made to assess civilian deaths within  
armed conflicts14 as well as total deaths from violence 
worldwide15. However, comparative analysis of violence  
by law enforcement officials, which impacts not only 
on human rights but also on public health and social 
development more broadly, is still lacking.
Against that backdrop and with the support of a grant from 
the Open Society Foundations, in 2019 the authors of this 
report began a project titled ‘Toward a Lethal Force Monitor’, 
building on work by the late Anneke Osse. Our goal is 
to enhance the policies and practices of law enforcement 
agencies with the ultimate aim of reducing unnecessary 
deaths and injuries. To do so, we set out to assess the 
availability and reliability of information relating to deaths 
following any use of force by policing and law enforcement 
officials. This report undertakes this assessment in relation to 
four jurisdictions: Belgium, England & Wales, France and the 
Netherlands. It is our intention to support current debate, 
8 http://www.wetheprotesters.org, (accessed 4 December 2020).
9 P. Chevigny, ‘Police Deadly Force as Social Control’, Criminal Law Forum, vol. 1, no. 3, 1990, pp.389-425.
10 A. Osse and I. Cano, ‘Police Deadly Use of Firearms: An International Comparison’, The International Journal of Human Rights, vol. 21, no. 5, 2017,  
pp.629-649, DOI: 10.1080/13642987.2017.1307828.
11 See for example, UN General Assembly, A/64/228, 5 August 2009, Para 6, on the State’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and its 
responsibility to determine the circumstances in which individuals can lawfully use force, https://undocs.org/A/64/228, (accessed 4 December 2020).
12 http://www.genevadeclaration.org/the-geneva-declaration/who-has-signed-it.html, (accessed 4 December 2020).
13 WHO. International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th Revision, 2010, http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/
browse/2010/en#/Y35-Y36, (accessed 4 December 2020).
14 https://www.everycasualty.org, (accessed 4 December 2020).
15 https://grevd.org, (accessed 4 December 2020).
16 As defined in the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (commentary to Section 1), law enforcement officials include: ‘(a) [a]ll officers 
of the law, whether appointed or elected, who exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention. (b) In countries where police 
powers are exercised by military authorities, whether uniformed or not, or by State security forces, the definition of law enforcement officials shall be 
regarded as including officers of such services.’  In light of the policing situation in each of the countries examined in this report, we treat the terms ‘law 
enforcement officials’ and ‘police officers’ as synonymous, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/lawenforcementofficials.aspx, (accessed  
4 December 2020). 
research and policies that improve practices associated with 
the use of force and to enhance state accountability. It is also 
our intention to complement, not detract from, longer term, 
more ambitious efforts to reimagine how policing takes place. 
This report is underpinned by a set of guiding principles:
•  Every death associated with the use of force by law 
enforcement officials16 should be recorded, recognised and 
investigated. No one’s death should go unacknowledged and 
any lessons should not go unexamined.
•  Producing detailed, reliable, and publicly accessible 
information for each individual death and deaths overall in a 
jurisdiction is a necessary step in ensuring the accountability 
of law enforcement agencies, ministries and governments. 
Such information is also vital in understanding whether 
particular groups in society are not disproportionately 
affected by police use of force. 
•  Lessons should be promptly acted upon in order to help 
prevent future deaths.
•  Surviving family members and others directly affected by 
bereavement should be engaged in a meaningful way with 
investigation processes and subsequent outcomes.
•  State agencies need to establish and publicise systematic 
procedures for monitoring and reducing harms (especially 
deaths) associated with the use of force. 
•  Ensuring practices are in line with the letter and spirit of 
relevant national and international laws, codes and standards 
is an important part of achieving these objectives, but so 
too is the willingness to recognise how such laws, codes and 
standards need to be improved.
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Scope  
In investigating the availability and reliability of information relating to deaths 
associated with the use of force by law enforcement officials, it is important  
to be precise about which deaths are included and excluded from study.
17 The European Convention on Human Rights is the name most commonly used to refer to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf, (accessed 5 December 2020).
18 McCann and Others v United Kingdom, 27 September 1995 (Application no. 18984/91).
19 McShane v United Kingdom, 28 May 2002 (Application no. 43290/98).
20 Velikova v Bulgaria, 18 May 2000 (Application no. 41488/98).
21 In finding the duty to investigate in Article 2 the ECtHR was indirectly influenced by the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms 
(1990) and the UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, Economic and Social Council 
Resolution 1989/65, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/executions.pdf, (accessed 5 December 2020).
The focus of this report is Western Europe, and specifically 
the jurisdictions of Belgium, England & Wales, France, and 
the Netherlands. These systems are of interest in their 
own right, but also because of the legal standards in place. 
All these states adhere to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR)17. The ECHR is often held up as the 
most robust international human rights law framework. 
Article 2 ECHR on the right to life states that:
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No 
one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the 
execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction 
of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in 
contravention of this Article when it results from the use 
of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
 (a) In defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
  (b) In order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the 
escape of a person lawfully detained; 
  (c) In action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling  
a riot or insurrection.
Article 2’s scope regarding the use of force has been 
extended by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) since the ruling in McCann and Others v UK  
(1995)18, by reading Article 2 in conjunction with Article 
1, the obligation to respect the rights and freedoms in the 
ECHR, and with the ECtHR’s general requirement that 
rights are secured in practical and effective ways.
The core objectives of Article 2 are to achieve state 
accountability under the rule of law, to restrict the use 
of lethal force, and to ensure that states learn from lethal 
incidents. Article 2 now covers:
•  Intentional and unintentional deaths.
•  Deaths (as well as serious threats to life) caused by any 
agent of the state.
•  Deaths resulting from any form of conduct involving 
any use of force against another and not just ‘the use of 
weapons or physical violence’ (McShane v UK (2002)19 
para 101). The Court has held that ‘in assessing evidence, 
the general principle applied in cases has been to apply 
the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”... 
However, such proof may follow from the coexistence 
of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences 
or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Where 
the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the 
exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case 
of persons within their control while in custody, strong 
presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries and 
death occurring during that detention. Indeed, the burden 
of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities 
to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation.’ 
(Velikova v Bulgaria (2000)20 para 70).
•  The compatibility of the state’s legal framework with 
Article 2.
•  The state’s positive obligation to minimise risk to life in  
its planning and control of all activities. 
•  The duty to carry out an effective official investigation 
‘when individuals have been killed as a result of the use  
of force’ (McCann and Others v UK (1995) para 161)21. 
Under this duty investigations must be:
 w  adequate and effective, i.e. capable of establishing cause 
of death and responsibility for it22
 w  independent and impartial
 w  transparent and open to public scrutiny, including family 
involvement, within limits of feasibility and security
 w  reasonably prompt and expeditious.
In Police Lethal Force and Accountability, we share the 
fundamental principles and goals of Article 2 ECHR, but we 
are not solely focused on issues of compliance with it, or 
potential liability under it. Our work is also motivated by 
awareness of the problematic limits, gaps and silences within 
and around Article 2 law. For example:
•  Not all potential claimants under Article 2 can bring a 
case before the ECtHR due to lack of access to legal 
representation or due to procedural restrictions.
•  Article 2 law has a broad scope and can produce strict 
standards for state conduct, but it is ‘a floor not a ceiling’ 
and allows flexibility in states’ recourse to force and their 
policing and investigatory practices. Article 2 standards 
and state practices can therefore in some instances be 
challenged and improved.
•  Despite a generally broad approach to interpreting potential 
causal connections between state control processes, 
state agents’ conduct and a victim’s death, in some cases 
a reductive and restrictive approach by the ECtHR can 
exclude state decisions and conduct from scrutiny under 
Article 2 ECHR23.
•  The ECtHR underlines the importance of Article 2 by 
declaring that it ‘enshrines one of the basic values of the 
democratic societies making up the Council of Europe’ 
(McCann and Others v UK (1995) para 147), but the analysis 
of lethal force is case-specific and does not address  
22 In developing these requirements under Article 2 the ECtHR acknowledged the so-called ‘Minnesota Protocol’ or UN Manual (1991) that gave 
further effect to the UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, https://www.ohchr.org/en/
issues/executions/pages/revisionoftheunmanualpreventionextralegalarbitrary.aspx, (accessed 5 December 2020) and the conjoined judgments in McKerr 
v United Kingdom, Hugh Jordan v United Kingdom, Shanaghan v United Kingdom, and Kelly and Others v United Kingdom, all 4 May 2001 (Application nos. 
28883/95, 24746/94, 37715/97 and 30054/96).
23 Such as where the ECtHR’s configuration of evidence excludes aspects of operational planning and control, or its acceptance of state discretion 
leaves a state’s choice and deployment of weaponry unexamined.
24 Some consideration is given to the use of official weapons or equipment while officers are off duty, but this is done unevenly across the countries. 
For reasons of feasibility, we exclude deaths resulting from road traffic accidents; deaths occurring in the prison system or immigration detention 
facilities; deaths that are self-inflicted following contact with a state agent; and deaths caused by private individuals acting to support state agents or 
state services (such as privatised transportation of detainees or private security guards supporting policing functions).
broader trends within or among contracting states, or 
internationally, in relation to wider democratic values.
•  Issues of discrimination (e.g. regarding sex, race, ethnicity) 
in state practices tend to fall outside Article 2 case law and 
remain invisible due to a general lack of available data.
In light of the above, this report seeks to assess the availability 
and reliability of data relating to:
•  all deaths (intended and unintended);
•  resulting from (i.e. apparently caused by) or associated 
with (i.e. occurring in the context of, during or after) any 
application of force (including but not limited to physical 
force, the use of batons, firearms and other ‘less lethal’ 
weapons, firing warning shots, and the use of restraint 
techniques and apparatus) by state agents with responsibility 
for policing and law enforcement;
•  in situations including the apprehension of suspected 
offenders, defence of self or others against perceived 
threats, restraint of suspects or arrestees (during an incident 
or in custody), control and management of public order 
including suppressing violent assemblies, and the fulfilment 
of other relevant duties of state agents24.
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Country Reports
Note on Content and Approach
The individual country reports that follow examine  
a number of issues, including:
•  Official statistics on extent of use of lethal force by law enforcement officials;
•  The procedures for collecting and publishing official data;
•  The quality of such official data;
•  How lessons are or are not learnt from the analysis of deaths; 
•  The characteristics of investigations by official agencies;
•  The availability of relevant data from unofficial sources in each system.
These issues were derived from an initial comparison of the procedures, policies 
and practices in each of the four jurisdictions covered, as well as through drawing 
on secondary literature about the police use of force. Each of the authors related 
to a specific system provided a provisional classification of those policies and 
practices according to the schema set out at the start of each country report. 
Subsequently, all of the authors of Police Lethal Force and Accountability discussed 
these initial classifications and adjusted them where necessary to ensure that they 
were consistently calibrated relative to each other. Consultations were also made 
with a number of key stakeholder organisations and experts for comments on the 
factual accuracy of the country reports. 
The colour coding in Table 1 (see pp.6-7 above) and in the tables appearing at the 
start of each country report reflects the outcomes of the process. In the absence 
of any international benchmarking standards, the classifications given in the 
tables are intended as indicative, headline summations of the evidence presented. 
The individual country reports should be consulted for specific detail about the 
procedures, policies and practices in each system, as well as recommendations  
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Belgium
Belgium
1.  Are the number of deaths following any police use of force (be it firearms, ‘less lethal’ weapons  
or other force): 
Collected? P
Publicly available? L
Is this a legal requirement? P
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? P
2.  If published, to what extent is the number of deaths readily identifiable from official statistics? 
What work needs to be done to pull these out?
L
3. Are the deceased identified by name? G
4.  Is demographic and other information for the deceased (including ethnic background, age and gender):
Collected? P
Publicly available? N
Is this a legal requirement? N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? L
5. Is demographic and other information for LEOs:
Collected? P
Publicly available? N
Is this a legal requirement? L
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? L
6. Is information on the circumstances:
Collected? L
Publicly available? L
Is this a legal requirement? N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? L
7. Is information about the type(s) of force used:
Collected? G
Publicly available? N
Is this a legal requirement? N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? L
Belgium
Data Quality of Official Sources
8. How reliable are the sources used to produce official statistics about deaths? P
9. Internal quality assurance / verification conducted L
10. Methodology for data collection publicly specified  N
11. How reliable are the overall figures produced? P
Data Analysis and Lessons Learnt
12. State / police agencies analyse data to generate evidence-based recommendations / lessons 
learnt, in order to prevent future deaths
L
13. Evidence that state / police agencies act on the results of their analysis, including applying 
lessons learnt
P
14. External bodies are able to reuse data for their own analyses P
15. External, non-governmental agencies collect, and are able to publish, their own statistics on 
deaths following police use of force
P
Investigations by Official Agencies
16. Is there a legal requirement for deaths to be independently investigated? G
17. Is there an authority, separate from the one involved in the incident, which conducts 
investigations into deaths? If so, which organisation(s) conduct these investigations? ★
18. How independent are the investigations conducted by the organisation(s) named above? 
Please consider the extent to which they are independent and separate in terms of  
a) legal structure, b) hierarchy, c) investigative activity and personnel, d) operational ability  
(or ‘self-reliance’) e) oversight and control
P
19. Involvement of close relatives in the investigations U
20. Investigation reports into deaths are:
Publicly available? L
Do they give reasons for the conclusions they have reached? U
Is this a legal requirement? N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? L
21. Information available on legal proceedings against agents / officials pursuant to deaths N
22. Information available on legal proceedings against state agencies pursuant to deaths N
23. Information available on disciplinary proceedings against agents/ officials pursuant to deaths N
24. Number of prosecutions against agents / officials involved in the last ten years? L
25. Number of convictions against agents / officials involved in the last ten years? L
26. Number of prosecutions against agencies involved in the last ten years? N
27. Number of convictions against agencies involved in the last ten years? N










G L N UP
★  Committee P, General Inspection Service, judicial authorities
Data Collection and Publication by Official Agencies
Based on the 2018 reporting period (calendar year)
16   Police Lethal Force and Accountability  17 
Since 1 January 2002, the integrated police in Belgium 
consist of both the federal police and the local police25.  
The federal police have around 14,500 employees, including 
11,000 operational staff and 3,500 civilian employees. Local 
police consist of 185 different local police forces with 
diverging ranges of operational territory and amounts of 
personnel. The total of personnel of all local police forces 
is approximately 34,100 employees, including 28,300 
operational staff and 5,800 civilian employees. This means 
Belgium has 4.2 police officers (operational staff) per 1,000 
inhabitants26. The federal police and local police differ in 
terms of territory and specialisation. For example, the local 
police forces are involved in general policing activities within 
their allocated zone, whereas the federal police forces are 
mostly concerned with specific tasks and/or supporting the 
local police. Certain tasks can overlap which leads to a less 
than clear distinction between the two levels of police in 
Belgium27.
The Internal Supervision Service (ISS), the General 
Inspection Service (GIS) and Committee P control both 
federal and local police forces. The Internal Supervision 
Service is charged with three main tasks: handling 
complaints, proactive research and supporting policy28. 
There is an ISS in every local police force and one ISS for 
the federal police in general. This means that the Internal 
Supervision Service is a part of the (internal) police 
25 H. Berkmoes, E. De Raedt, and F. Goossens, De Belgische reguliere politie. I: Een dwarsdoorsnede van haar wetgeving, organisatie, taken en 
bevoegdheden [The Belgian regular police. I: A cross-section of its legislation, organization, tasks and powers]. Mechelen, Wolters Kluwer, 2009.
26 Rekenhof, Werving en selectie bij de federale politie, Brussels, 2015, https://www.courtofaudit.be/Docs/2015_10_WervingSelectieFederalePolitie.
pdf, (accessed 8 August 2020). Open VLD. Lahaye-Battheu: Nog steeds 3.707 politieagenten tekort. https://www2.openvld.be/lahaye-battheu-nog-
steeds-3-707-politieagenten-tekort, (accessed 8 August 2020).
27 B. De Ruyver, ‘Tien jaar politiehervorming: een proeve tot evaluatie van de evaluatie’, in W. Bruggeman, E. Devroe, and M. Easton (eds.), 
Evaluatie van 10 jaar politiehervorming: Terugkijken in het verleden en vooruitkijken in de toekomst [Evaluation of 10 years of police reform: Looking back 
in the past and looking ahead in the future], Antwerpen Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2010, pp.115-129. FedPol [Federal Police], (2018). Jaarverslag 2018 van 
de Federale Politie, http://rapportannuel.policefederale.be/index-nl.html, (accessed 5 July 2020).
28 Administrative circular POL48 of 06 July 1994 concerning the establishment of an ‘internal supervision’ service for municipal police forces.  
Local Police, 11 January 2005. Internal supervision. Permanent note, p.1.
29 A police college is a Belgian executive body on the local level that exercises authority in police zones consisting of several municipalities. The 
police college is formed by the mayors of the affiliated municipalities in the police zone. It is up to the college to decide what materials and 
resources are to be procured in order to carry out tasks.
30 General Inspection Act 2007. 
31 G. Van de Walle, P. Ponsaers, and E. De Pauw, Zakboekje Politiefunctie [Police Function Pocketbook], Mechelen, Kluwer, 2009. Administrative 
circular POL 56 of 20 December 1996 concerning the supervision of the use of force by police officers.
hierarchy. By contrast, the General Inspection Service is a 
form of ombudsman service, which investigates complaints 
and reports against an individual police officer or a police 
force. It is an independent agency situated outside the 
police hierarchy and falls directly under the responsibility of 
the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Minister of Justice 
or even the local authorities (mayor or police college29) 
when a local police force is involved30. The GIS will also 
conduct research into the operations of local or federal 
police forces, either on its own initiative or when directed 
to do so by the Minister of Internal Affairs. This research 
leads to recommendations with the aim of improving the 
general policing activities. Committee P assists parliament 
in its constitutional oversight of the executive powers. The 
main emphasis here lies in the supervision of the police 
function as a whole, and in particular the coordination, 
effectiveness and efficiency of police (services) and officials, 
as well as the way in which they deal with the protection 
of rights. Committee P carries out control and oversight 
activities and conducts complaint investigations31. For the 
purposes of this country report, these three control bodies 
will be assessed as one because the data collection and 
transparency of procedures are common between them. 
Belgium 
Data Collection and Publication 
by Official Agencies
According to the administrative circular GPI 62, the use 
of force by police is defined as: ‘any event accompanied 
by acts of violence involving the use or non-use of police 
weapons, intervention techniques or tactics’32. Any use of 
force by police (both local and federal) should be immediately 
reported to the Directorate of Administrative Police 
Operations (a department of the federal police), which 
collects such information for the operational support of 
the federal and local governments, federal police and local 
police33. In practice this first brief report will only be written 
and transferred if the incident has a large impact on the 
police organisation or society, meaning that minor incidents 
(e.g. an accident due to a lack of safety measures) will not 
be reported through this first type of report. It is therefore 
expected that lethal force will be reported through both a 
brief and an extensive report34. 
An extensive report on individual instances of the use 
of force is made to the General directorate of resource 
management and information (a department of the federal 
police). This second type of report supports the supervision, 
management and production of qualitative and quantitative 
analyses by the Internal Supervision Services, the General 
Inspection of the Federal and Local Police and Committee 
P. It is also transferred to the Directorate of the Service for 
Prevention and Protection at Work, the Training Directorate 
and ‘Use of Force & Sports’ department of the national police 
academy for internal consideration. For example, the report 
can be used as a basis for making changes to training carried 
out in the national police academy. It contains at least the 
32 Royal Decree of 3 June 2007. Administrative circular GPI 62 29 February 2008.
33 Royal Decree of 3 June 2007. Administrative circular GPI 62 29 February 2008.
34 Vico Cockx (Head of the Use of Force & Sports department), Personal Communication (28 September 2020): ‘Artikel 4.3 van de GPI62 bepaalt dat 
“enerzijds, vanuit dwingend operationeel standpunt, …” (voorbeeld noodzaak Heli, patrouillehond, stressteam, …). Het was de uitdrukkelijke visie/vraag 
van de Vaste Commissie van de Lokale Politie om niet steeds ASAP de Federale Politie in te lichten voor minder belangrijke incidenten (vb. ongeval 
veiligheidsmaatregelen, …). Wel indien de impact groot is (operationeel standpunt). Je kan dus wel vermoeden dat er bij letaal politiegeweld altijd ASAP 
wordt gemeld aan DAO.’
35 Royal Decree of 3 June 2007. Administrative circular GPI 62 29 February 2008.
36 The complaint form is clearly structured, whereas the compulsory form used by the police is different for each police force. The complaint form 
explicitly asks if there were any witnesses.
37 Committee P, File a complaint, https://comitep.be/klacht-indienen.html, (accessed 5 August 2020).
following information: description of the facts (nature and 
circumstances, injured persons/victims; and if the incident 
involves the use of weapons, their type, brand and calibre); 
location, date and time; member(s) of staff involved (surname, 
first name, rank, the police force to which the agent belongs, 
identification number); and the coordinates of the contact 
person (for any additional information). Any use of firearms 
must also be reported to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
Reporting any loss or theft of a firearm is also part of this 
reporting obligation35.
Data can also be retrieved through complaints. A civilian 
can file a complaint with the Internal Supervision Services, 
the General Inspection Service or Committee P. These 
complaints can be accessed through the database of the 
three supervision services mentioned above. The information 
obtained through the complaint does not significantly 
differ from the information retrieved though the reporting 
obligation of both the first operational report and the 
extensive report of the police forces36. Even though it 
might be expected that the extensive report could contain 
more information than the complaint form, the amount of 
information depends on the individual officer filling in the 
form. The main difference lies in the change of perspective. 
Whereas the reporting obligation is conducted by a police 
officer, complaints are filled in by civilians who were directly 
involved in certain situations. Just like the reporting obligation 
(both the ‘basic’ form and the ‘extensive’ form), the complaint 
form is event-based. This implies that different complaints 
about police uses of force are bundled when they are about 
the same event (for instance, police use of force during a 
protest by the Black Lives Matter movement)37. 
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The complaint form and reporting obligation do not 
necessarily indicate whether there is a connection between 
the use of force and the death of a civilian and/ or a police 
officer. To find this out, one must consult reports of the 
judicial authorities. Yet judicial authorities will only publish 
the description of certain cases and the decision of a court 
in respect of individual cases only, which means this is 
qualitative data. There is no readily available quantitative 
data on lethal force. Quantitative data has to be compiled 
from information contained in individual files, to the extent 
that they have been the object of judicial reports, which are 
themselves not publicly available. Research on lethal force 
has not been publicly published or noted so far, including 
quantitative analysis. However, in 2019 Committee P 
published a report examining individual judicial decisions 
concerning members of the police in 2015, 2016 and 2017, 
as well as instances of police violence (politiegeweld) from 
2013 to 2017. This report offered a cumulative analysis of 
different judicial decisions and case descriptions38. 
The three modes of generating data (through the reporting 
obligation, complaint forms and judicial cases) are not 
proactively published by the authorities involved. Yet 
anyone interested can consult these documents due to 
the Belgian constitution, which states: ‘Everyone has the 
right to consult and receive a copy of each administrative 
document, except in the cases and under the conditions 
determined by law’39. The term ‘administrative documents’ 
is interpreted broadly to include datasets, policy documents 
or even messages between government executives. This 
emphasis on transparency has been further elaborated  
in the Federal law on openness of government. This law 
states certain exceptions, for example information on 
personal affairs40.
38 Committee P, Judicial decisions concerning members of the police: 2015, 2016 and 2017 and Police brutality: 2013 to 2017, 2019, https://comitep.
be/document/cahiers/Cahier%2033%20-%20%20Rechterlijke%20beslissingen.pdf (accessed 8 August 2020). 
39 The Belgian Constitution, art. 32, https://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/publications/constitution/GrondwetUK.pdf, (accessed 5 
December 2020).
40 D. Voorhoof, ‘Openess of public administration in Belgium: a loose bag’, Samenleving en politiek, vol. 17, no. 3, 2010, pp.56-61.
41 Committee P, Use of force and violence in response to large-scale events and police operations, https://comitep.be/document/
onderzoeksrapporten/2009%20gebruik%20van%20dwang%20en%20geweld%20nl.pdf, (accessed 9 August 2020). Committee P, Annual report 
2010, p.72, https://comitep.be/document/jaarverslagen/2010NL.pdf, (accessed 9 August 2020).
42 If multiple civilians are involved, police officers only need to add the number of civilians involved next to the description of the main civilian 
involved.
43 Vico Cockx, Personal Communication, (28 September 2020): ‘TER INFO: Er bestaat een gestandaardiseerd document (zie bijlage) dat sinds 
kort in de geautomatiseerde politieapplicaties (nu al in ISLP, Lokale Politie en sommige Federale Politie – kortelings ook in FEEDIS, andere Federale 
Politie) geïntegreerd is. Het zal bij opstellen van een proces-verbaal met bepaalde classificatie automatisch worden ingevuld maar ook onafhankelijk 
als “meldingsdocument” kunnen worden ingevuld.’
Data Quality
Despite the obligation to report violent incidents and the 
use of firearms, this requirement is not always complied 
with and is not fully implemented. This is partly due to 
the reporting process itself, as the content, scope and 
analytical precision of a report depend on the subjective 
interpretation of its author. All this means available data 
is unreliable. Committee P emphasized the need for a 
standardized form for reporting firearms use. It argued that 
a standard form and a standard procedure combined with 
better compliance with the reporting obligation would be 
a major step forward41. The advice of committee P has 
resulted in the creation of a standard form. In June 2019 it 
was introduced in the Belgian local police zones and some 
departments of the federal police. In July 2020 the standard 
form was introduced in the remaining departments of 
the federal police. It will be filled in automatically when an 
official report with a certain classification is drawn up but 
can also be filled in independently as a reporting document. 
Within this standard form the following elements must 
be described: reasoning of the use of force, description of 
the situation, identification of the main civilian involved42,  
behaviour of the suspect, signs of aggression of the civilian 
involved, attempted disarmament of an agent, tactical 
considerations, type of communication by police, use of 
physical force, use of weapons, following actions taken by 
involved police officer, medical evaluation and the name 
of the police officer involved43. It must be mentioned, that 
in 2016 the Directorate of the Service for Prevention and 
Protection at Work already distributed a standard form to 
all departments of the Belgian integrated police. Yet this 
form had a broad scope, as it should have been used to 
report all types of ‘accidents’ on the workplace including 
the reporting of a bodily injury, any event involving acts of 
violence, an explosion or fire in a police building and loss 
or theft of a weapon, parts of armaments, ammunition and 
bulletproof vests44. 
According to Willy Bruggeman, chair of the Belgian Federal 
Police Council, ‘Practices are quite different between police 
zones. There are of course the classic forms concerning the 
reporting obligation, but some elements within this form are 
without obligation. Because of these differences, we can speak 
of rather subjective data’45. This suggests that, in practice, 
police forces will pay varying attention to the use of force by 
their personnel. For example, referring to police zone Rhode 
Schelde, a middle-sized police force, spokesperson Ronny De 
Cuyper stated:
  We do not have a monitoring system as such used for 
violence by the police. Only violence against the police, 
but even then, our people do not always report this. This 
only happens in the event of professional incompetence. 
That does not alter the fact that violence is followed up 
by the police. Every day we have a debriefing of the past 
24 hours and a briefing of the next 24 hours. If excessive 
violence has been used, we can respond immediately46.
These quotations indicate that there is a limited amount of 
data on the use of force by the Belgian police. In addition, 
the present available data is marked by a certain amount 
of subjectivity and variability. This is because the reporting 
obligation is not always complied with and the reports 
themselves are not filled in consistently. This ambiguity of 
reporting on the use of force by police is exemplified in the 
case of Jozef Chovanec. 
44 Vico Cockx, Personal Communication, (28 September 2020): ‘Sinds 2016 was er een gestandaardiseerd word-formulier dat door de dienst welzijn 
(CGWB) binnen de GPI werd verspreid (zie bijlage).
45 Willy Bruggeman, Personal Communication, (6 April 2020): ‘De praktijken in de politiezones zijn heel verschillend. Er zijn natuurlijk de klassieke 
vormen, maar sommige elementen binnen dit formulier zijn vrijblijvend. Door deze verschillen kunnen we spreken van eerder subjectieve gegevens.’
46 Ronny De Cuyper, Personal Communication, (9 July 2020): ‘We hebben geen monitoringsysteem dat als zodanig wordt gebruikt voor geweld 
door de politie. Alleen geweld tegen de politie, maar ook dan doen onze mensen niet altijd aangifte. Dit gebeurt alleen in geval van professionele 
onbekwaamheid. Dat neemt niet weg dat geweld niet wordt opgevolgd door de politie. Elke dag hebben we een debriefing van de afgelopen 24 uur en 
een briefing van de komende 24 uur. Als er excessief geweld is gebruikt, kunnen we daar direct op reageren.’ 
47 S. Peek, ‘België geschokt over video gearresteerde Slowaak’ [‘Belgium shocked about video of arrested Slovakian citizen’], NRC (accessed 19 August 
2020). E. Bergmans, ‘Man sterft na politieoptreden in cel in Charleroi: “Mijn echtgenoot stierf zoals George Floyd”’ [‘Husband dies after police 
intervention in cell in Charleroi: “My husband died like George Floyd”’], De Standaard (accessed on 19 August 2020). 
48 Het Laatste Nieuws, KIJK LIVE: CD&V scherp voor Jambon en De Bolle: “Alle alarmbellen hadden moeten afgaan”’, [Watch LIVE: ‘CD&V sharp for 
Jambon and De Bolle: “All the alarm bells should have gone off”’], (accessed 1 September 2020). 
The case of Jozef Chovanec
On 19 August 2020, camera images appear showing a 
wounded detainee in a cell at Charleroi airport being 
overpowered by several police officers and dying. The 
man was the Slovakian Jozef Chovanec. He was arrested 
at Charleroi airport in 2018 for ‘not behaving well’. The 
camera footage shows the man banging his head against 
the wall of his cell in the airport until he starts bleeding. 
The policemen who enter the cell handcuff the man and 
place him on his stomach, after which several policemen lie 
down on him. On the footage it is also noticeable that one 
of the policemen is dancing while another one is making 
the ‘Hitler salute’. After sixteen minutes, medical personnel 
enter the cell. They try to resuscitate Chovanec in vain. 
At the time of writing, the judicial process is still ongoing 
which means that it is still unclear if the actions of the 
police officers led to the death of Jozef Chovanec47. 
The images led to a parliamentary hearing on 1 September 
2020. Both the minister of the interior in 2018 Jan Jambon, 
the head of the integrated police of 2018 Catherine De 
Bolle and the current head of integrated police Marc De 
Mesmaeker (who in 2018 was still working as a liaison 
between the federal police and the Jambon cabinet), 
stated that there is a difference between the images 
that appeared and the report that was drawn up at the 
time. The intervention on the tarmac and the arrest are 
described in detail, even with the damage suffered by the 
officers. What happened in the cell is all described only 
very briefly48. 
Belgium 
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Data Analysis and  
Lessons Learnt
Three organisations in Belgium have each produced an 
analysis of the use of force by police. These analyses  
are solely based on the topic of the use of force in  
general. There is no research on lethal force within  
the Belgian context. 
In 2019, Committee P published a report on the use of 
force (which includes non-lethal force) by police in which 
they qualitatively analysed a selection of dossiers involving 
both local and federal police. The cases were selected 
from the database of Committee P in the period of 2001 
to 2016. Committee P selected 21 dossiers on the use 
of force, but without considering whether any of these 
dossiers have led to a prosecution, resulted in a court 
ruling if there was a prosecution, or led to a decision 
by a supervision agency if there was no prosecution. As 
such, their analysis is purely based on complaints. The 21 
selected dossiers come from 14 different police zones 
and one from the federal police. Of these 21 dossiers, 5 
are chief inspectors and the others are inspectors. All of 
them are men. These members of staff occupy front-line 
positions such as intervention and anti-crime brigades. 
All these staff members are in direct contact with the 
population. The police forces involved were informed of 
the investigation by letter in August 2017. From September 
2017, Committee P contacted these services to gain access 
to the necessary and available material, in particular the 
personal files, the disciplinary files and the files concerning 
accidents at work.  
175 incidents on the use of force were recorded for these 
21 individuals. As mentioned earlier, not all incidents have 
led to a prosecution or have been held by a court to 
involve an offence. When analysing the individual 
49 Committee P, Judicial decisions concerning members of the police: 2015, 2016 and 2017 and Police brutality: 2013 to 2017, 2019,  
https://comitep.be/document/cahiers/Cahier%2033%20-%20%20Rechterlijke%20beslissingen.pdf (accessed 8 August 2020).
50 The Permanent Centre for Citizenship and Participation (CPCP) is a non-profit association recognised since 2010 by the Wallonia-Brussels 
Federation as a permanent educational institution. The CPCP’s mission is to accompany and consolidate the processes that favour the emergence 
or reinforcement of an effective, informed, structured, innovative, critical and resilient citizenship. 
dossiers, Committee P found out that some led to a 
prosecution and others did not. The amount or reasoning 
of prosecutions was not specified. Yet, it is important to 
note that when a prosecutorial file is opened, the final 
judicial decision can be made several years after the events 
involved. The judicial decisions are often shelved for various 
reasons. For three members of staff, however, the court’s 
decision was followed by disciplinary measures. Committee 
P describes three lessons learned. First, Committee P 
recommended that greater importance should be given 
to continuous professional performance appraisal, in 
order to break away from the short-term perspective of 
occasional appraisals and make it easier to address and 
adjust impulsive and aggressive attitudes and behaviour that 
become apparent over time. Second, on the question of 
evaluation and discipline, the local police zones were called 
on to conclude agreements among themselves in order to 
appoint preparatory investigators or experts in disciplinary 
matters. Third, Committee P called for the establishment 
of a system to centralize data about specialist training in 
order to facilitate monitoring of training needs, especially 
with regard to violence reduction49. Yet, despite these 
three recommendations from Committee P, there is no 
clear indication of how the Belgian federal or local police 
have incorporated these lessons learned in their respective 
organisations. 
The other two organisations that have produced analyses 
of police uses of force are Centre Permanent pour la 
Citoyenneté & Participation50 (CPCP, Permanent Centre for 
Citizenship and Participation), which is a semi-governmental 
organisation (partially funded by the Walloon regional 
government), and Police Watch, which is a public research 
centre. Centre Permanent pour la Citoyenneté & Participation 
produced a qualitative document analysis based on reports 
from Committee P and the League of Human Rights, which 
is a movement that monitors respect for human rights in 
Belgium. Human rights are fundamental rights that every 
human being has, simply because he or she is human, and 
the League encourages governments and municipalities to 
increase their respect for those rights. It does so in many 
ways: through pressure in the media, lobbying and strategic 
legal actions51. Centre Permanent pour la Citoyenneté & 
Participation emphasized the lack of clear statistics on the use 
of force by police and problems concerning the monitoring 
bodies, which are neither independent nor impartial: 
Statistics on the use of force by the police are rather 
sketchy, incomplete and difficult to obtain. One of the 
prerogatives of Committee P is to issue an annual report 
on this subject, but not all complaints are recorded in it. 
Indeed, in these reports, only complaints received directly 
by Committee P are included. Complaints received by the 
GIS or ISS are therefore not included (…) In addition the 
current control bodies seem to lack independence from 
the police52. 
Police Watch is a public research centre established by the 
League of Human Rights. Through their website, civilians 
can report if they have been a victim of force used by the 
police or a witness to a use of (lethal) force by police. 
Based on these claims, Police Watch has published a report 
on the use of force by police. Their results have not been 
very different compared to the report of Committee P as 
elaborated above. Also, within their lessons learned they state 
that the existence of police abuse should be recognized and 
monitored in order to produce official figures53. 
In conclusion it should be noted that neither Committee P, 
CPCP nor Police Watch have conducted research on lethal 
force, but only on uses of force by police in general.  
51 Ligue des droit humains, La LDH, https://www.liguedh.be/la-ldh/qui-sommes-nous, (accessed 25 August 2020).
52 Centre Permanent pour la Citoyenneté et la Participation (2020). Belgium, a bad student in terms of police violence?,  
http://www.cpcp.be/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/violences-policieres.pdf, (accessed 8 August 2020).
53 Police Watch, Police: abuse and confinement, http://www.liguedh.be/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Rapport-Police-Watch-LDH-2020.pdf,  
(accessed 10 August 2020). 
54 Local Police, 11 January 2005. Internal supervision. Permanent note, p.1.
55 General Inspection Act, 2007.
56 G. Vande Walle, P. Ponsaers, E. De Pauw (2009). Zakboekje Politiefunctie [Police Function Pocketbook], Mechelen, Kluwer, 2009. Administrative circular 
POL 56 of 20 December 1996 concerning the supervision of the use of force by police officers.
57 A. Verhage, Supervision and Control of the Police, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2012, p.134.
58 General Inspection Act, 2007. General Inspection Service, activities report 2018, 2019, https://www.politie.be/aigpol/aigpol/sites/aigpol/files/
attachments/AIG-Evaluatieverslag%202018-Toepassing%20van%20de%20MFO2.pdf, (accessed 10 August 2020).  
Investigations by Official 
Agencies 
As mentioned at the start of this country report, lethal force 
in general is controlled by three control bodies in Belgium. 
The Internal Supervision Service carries out audits on its own 
initiative and acts proactively in this way. For every complaint 
that the service receives, it systematically produces a file. 
An investigation which determines whether a certain act is 
legal follows54. The General Inspection Service investigates 
complaints and reports regarding the behaviour of a police 
officer and the functioning of a police service55. Committee 
P carries out both surveillance investigations and complaint 
investigations56. Committee P and the General Inspection 
Service have overlapping powers with regard to dealing with 
complaints about the police and carrying out investigations 
into police operations. Supervision on the operations 
(including investigations) of local police and federal police  
is carried out in parallel.  
In contrast to the Internal Supervision Service, Committee P 
and the General Inspection Service are independent agencies 
due to their position in the framework of the Belgian police. 
That is because they are placed outside the police institutional 
hierarchy57. Yet, in terms of the composition of the personnel 
of Committee P and the General Inspection Service, concerns 
can be raised about their degree of independence in practice. 
Even though their websites state that they are independent 
agencies, the personnel of the General Inspection Service 
consist of seconded police officers and members of the 
administrative and logistics framework of the federal police or 
a local police force58. This staffing arrangement is also similar 
in Committee P, some of whose investigative staff are police 
Belgium 
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officers on secondment from their services59. It is legitimate 
to question the impartiality of these investigative services, 
given that some members will, after their service in the 
supervisory bodies, return to work in a police department.  
In addition, investigation reports into deaths are only 
available through judicial authorities. They are not made 
public and they mostly describe legal and disciplinary 
proceedings. This type of information has a qualitative 
nature, resulting in a lack of statistics on the amount of 
prosecutions and convictions60. Only Committee P has 
analysed prosecutions for uses of force by the police. 
Within their report they have stated that from 2009-2017 
there were a total of 236 prosecutions, of which ‘merely’ 
30 prosecutions against 41 members of the police led  
to a conviction. Also, within this timeframe, none of  
the prosecutions led to imprisonment of a police officer, 
which would be the appropriate sentence for the ‘murder’ 
of a civilian61.
59 Supervision of Police and Intelligence Services Act, 18 July 1991. Committee P, Our Organisation, https://comitep.be/organisatie.html, (accessed  
4 August 2020).
60 Public Access to Government Act, 11 April 1994. 
61 Committee P, Judicial decisions concerning members of the police: 2015, 2016 and 2017 and Police brutality: 2013 to 2017, 2019,  
https://comitep.be/document/cahiers/Cahier%2033%20-%20%20Rechterlijke%20beslissingen.pdf, (accessed 8 August 2020).
62 Marc Duplessis (OCAD). ‘Police and Weapons,’ interviewed by Jannes Van de Ponseele, Ghent University, 22 November 2018.  
Willy Bruggeman, Personal Communication, (6 April 2020).
63 Own source. Words used in search: politiegeweld + dood; politie + schiet; politie.
Non-official Sources and 
Analysis
It is certainly not inconceivable that the discharge of 
firearms without consequences or other uses of force will 
not be reported to the Internal Supervision Service, the 
General Inspection Service or Committee P. However, 
instances resulting in deaths will certainly not be hidden 
in Belgium; such cases have always been reported in the 
media in the past62. The website https://academic.gopress.
be contains detailed information about media reporting 
on lethal force resulting in death (2010-2020). Through a 
systematic review of newspaper articles, we have found 19 
articles on lethal force63. 
In addition, Amnesty International collects information, 
interviews victims, attends court hearings, meets 
government representatives and compiles all this data into 
robust investigation reports on the use of force by police. 
However, their research on lethal force has only been 
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Recommendations
There is a need for both an institutional adjustment and a 
procedural adjustment of data collection, data analysis and 
reporting of data. 
1)  Regarding the institutional adjustment, we 
refer to the need for a better division of roles 
and tasks between the Internal Supervision 
Services, Committee P and the General 
Inspection Service. These inspection bodies were 
set up to inform respectively the head of the local 
government, the federal Parliament and the Ministry 
of Interior about developments in the relevant police 
forces. It is a challenge for Belgium to reduce this 
ambiguity given the embedding of each of these 
services in the administrative apparatus. The presence 
of three different monitoring bodies contributes 
to a fragmentation of data collection because their 
supervision on the operations (including investigations) 
of local police and federal police is carried out in 
parallel. In addition, control of the use of force  
by the police often remains in the hands of seconded 
ex-police personnel. This generates questions in terms 
of neutrality as they eventually return to operational 
police work. Consequently, we recommend that: 
•  Serious consideration be given to the question whether 
the installation of a single monitoring body could 
contribute to a better follow-up of lethal force. When 
both the legislative powers and the executive powers 
have the same data at their disposal, transparency and 
accountability of state actors could increase.  
2)  Regarding the procedural adjustment of lethal 
force monitoring, several elements can be 
distinguished from each other in the current 
arrangements. In this context, we recommend 
that: 
•  The internal exchange of information of those instances 
involved in the follow-up of lethal force should be more 
streamlined. A better exchange of information can be 
achieved through a clear role assignment (as elaborated 
above) and diminishing the administrative burden. When 
a situation of lethal force arises, the individual officer 
is obliged to produce two different reports. In the 
first report (brief report), the officer should present a 
description of the circumstances and submit it as soon 
as possible to the Directorate of Administrative Police 
Operations for operational purposes. The second 
report (extensive report) also contains a description 
of the circumstances complemented by additional 
data for the purposes of supervision, management and 
production of qualitative and quantitative analyses. This 
report must be submitted to the three control bodies 
(ISS, GIS and Committee P), the Directorate of the 
Service for Prevention and Protection at Work, the 
Training Directorate and the ‘Use of Force & Sports’ 
department of the national police academy. 
•  Consideration be given to the implications of leaving the 
reporting of force used by police personnel in the field 
to be dependent on the initiative of the individual police 
officer and their supervisor. Although there is a legal 
reporting obligation for any form of violence used by 
police personnel, whether the use of force is reported 
to the above-mentioned authorities depends on the 
content of the report. This vulnerability will remain, 
even after the introduction of the standard form in 
2020 which will be generated based on any official 
report that contains reference to the use of force by 
the police.  
•  Consideration be given to the introduction of a single 
use of force database. The lack of a ‘database on the use 
of force by police personnel’ fed by all the authorities 
mentioned above remains a shortcoming that has 
consequences for the transparency and reliability of 
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England & Wales
England & Wales
1.  Are the number of deaths following any police use of force (be it firearms, ‘less lethal’ weapons or other force): 
Collected? G
Publicly available? G
Is this a legal requirement? N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? G
2.  If published, to what extent is the number of deaths readily identifiable from official statistics? 
What work needs to be done to pull these out?
P
3. Are the deceased identified by name? P
4.  Is demographic and other information for the deceased (including ethnic background, age and gender):
Collected? G
Publicly available? G
Is this a legal requirement? N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? G
5. Is demographic and other information for LEOs:
Collected? G
Publicly available? N
Is this a legal requirement? N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? G
6. Is information on the circumstances:
Collected? G
Publicly available? G
Is this a legal requirement? N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? G
7. Is information about the type(s) of force used:
Collected? G
Publicly available? G
Is this a legal requirement? N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? G
England & Wales
Data Quality of Official Sources
8. How reliable are the sources used to produce official statistics about deaths? P
9. Internal quality assurance / verification conducted G
10. Methodology for data collection publicly specified  G
11. How reliable are the overall figures produced? P
Data Analysis and Lessons Learnt
12. State / police agencies analyse data to generate evidence-based recommendations / lessons 
learnt, in order to prevent future deaths
P
13. Evidence that state / police agencies act on the results of their analysis, including applying 
lessons learnt
L
14. External bodies are able to reuse data for their own analyses P
15. External, non-governmental agencies collect, and are able to publish, their own statistics on 
deaths following police use of force
G
Investigations by Official Agencies
16. Is there a legal requirement for deaths to be independently investigated? G
17. Is there an authority, separate from the one involved in the incident, which conducts 
investigations into deaths? If so, which organisation(s) conduct these investigations? ★
18. How independent are the investigations conducted by the organisation(s) named above? 
Please consider the extent to which they are independent and separate in terms of  
a) legal structure, b) hierarchy, c) investigative activity and personnel, d) operational ability  
(or ‘self-reliance’) e) oversight and control
P
19. Involvement of close relatives in the investigations P
20. Investigation reports into deaths are:
Publicly available? P
Do they give reasons for the conclusions they have reached? P
Is this a legal requirement? N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? G
21. Information available on legal proceedings against agents / officials pursuant to deaths L
22. Information available on legal proceedings against state agencies pursuant to deaths L
23. Information available on disciplinary proceedings against agents/ officials pursuant to deaths P
24. Number of prosecutions against agents / officials involved in the last ten years? N
25. Number of convictions against agents / officials involved in the last ten years? N
26. Number of prosecutions against agencies involved in the last ten years? L
27. Number of convictions against agencies involved in the last ten years? L










G L N UP
★  The IOPC (previously the IPCC) and the Coroner
Data Collection and Publication by Official Agencies
Based on March 2018 – March 2019 reporting period:
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England & Wales 
The police in England and Wales are comprised of 43 
territorial services, each with a specific geographical remit, 
and some specialist non-territorial forces (for instance,  
the British Transport Police, Ministry of Defence Police  
and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary). The territorial services 
are sometimes referred to as Home Office forces, due 
to the nature of their funding arrangements. Each police 
force is a distinct entity, with Chief Constables described as 
having operational independence over matters relating to 
their service.     
A number of other agencies are also involved in policing in 
England and Wales. These include the College of Policing, 
which describes itself as the professional body for the 
police in England and Wales, the National Police Chiefs 
Council (NPCC), which co-ordinates national police 
responses and approaches across the different police 
forces, and the Home Office, the government department 
responsible for interior affairs, which describes itself as 
supporting visible, responsible and accountable policing64. 
Oversight mechanisms include elected Police and Crime 
Commissioners (PCCs)65, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of the 
Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Service (HMICFRS)66, 
and the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC), 
which was launched following reform of the Independent 
Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) in 2018.
64 College of Policing, About us, https://www.college.police.uk/About/Pages/default.aspx and Home Office (undated) About Us, https://www.gov.uk/
government/organisations/home-office/about, (both accessed 18 August 2020).
65 With the exception of the Metropolitan Police and Greater Manchester Police (because London and Manchester have directly elected Mayors), 
each territorial police service has a directly elected Police and Crime Commissioner, with a remit to hold the police force, and chief constable, to 
account and deliver an effective and efficient police service in their area.
66 HMICFRS have a remit to independently assess and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of police forces in England and Wales.
67 Numbers taken from Home Office, Police Workforce, England and Wales, 31 March 2019, 2nd edn, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/831726/police-workforce-mar19-hosb1119.pdf, (accessed 18 August 2020).  
68 IOPC, What We Investigate and Next Steps, https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/investigations/what-we-investigate-and-next-steps, (accessed 18 
August 2020).
69 IOPC, Deaths During or Following Police Contact: Statistics for England and Wales 2018/19, 2019, https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/sites/default/
files/Documents/statistics/deaths_during_following_police_contact_201819.pdf, (accessed 18 August 2020). In addition, the IOPC notes that 
‘we publish full investigation reports for the most serious and high-profile incidents. Reports will sometimes be redacted to remove sensitive or 
private information...We remove news releases and investigation reports from our website six months after completing an investigation’, IOPC 
(undated) Our Investigations, https://policeconduct.gov.uk/investigations/our-investigations, (accessed 18 August 2020).
Reporting on deaths and police use of force is organised  
by financial year and this case study covers the period  
April 2018 – March 2019. For this reporting period, the  
43 territorial forces employed just over 123,000 police 
officers67. The focus here is on the collection, recording  
and publication of data and official statistics on deaths 
following use of force, but there are a number of other 
ways individual deaths are considered, including via  
inquests (legal inquiries into suspicious deaths) and  
IOPC investigations.
Data Collection and 
Publication by Official Agencies
Although it is not a legal requirement for them to do so, 
two official agencies publish aggregate statistics on police 
use of force in England and Wales, the IOPC and the 
Home Office.   
IOPC data collection and publication
The IOPC collects data on deaths directly from the police, 
who are required by law to refer certain matters to them, 
including cases where ‘someone had direct or indirect 
contact with the police when, or shortly before, they…
died. However, forces only need to refer cases where the 
contact may have caused or contributed to the death or 
injury’68. An annual publication is then produced using this 
data and IOPC internal data sources69.
Titled Deaths During or Following Police Contact, this IOPC 
publication classifies deaths into 5 categories: road traffic 
fatalities, fatal shootings, deaths in or following police custody, 
apparent suicides following police custody and other deaths 
following police contact that were subject to an independent 
investigation. Deaths following police use of force could fall 
under multiple headings. As a result, identifying and extracting 
from the publication those cases in which force is used 
requires close analysis of its various sections. 
Bearing in mind these caveats, during the 2018 – 2019 
reporting period it appears that at least 17 deaths followed 
police use of force (3 fatal shootings, 6 in or following police 
custody and 8 in the ‘other’ category). However, these figures 
should be treated with caution and we return to broader 
issues around data quality in the next section of the report.
Deaths During or Following Police Contact presents information 
on deaths in an anonymised, narrative format. However, 
the amount of information given varies according to how 
the death has been classified. This means that, while it may 
be provided to the IOPC, demographic information on the 
people who died, the officers involved, the circumstances of 
the incident and the types of force used are not consistently 
available for all deaths detailed in the report. In addition to 
the narrative information detailed in the report, demographic 
information such as age, gender and ethnicity are reported 
for each type of death in tables listed in an Appendix to the 
report. As deaths are categorised into the five sections listed 
above, it is not possible to identify from the tables those 
deaths which occurred after force was used. 
70 One of the authors of this report was involved in the design and implementation of this new form.
71 The form is available online at https://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/SDAR/Use%20of%20Force%20Monitoring%20master%20V4Mar18.pdf, 
(accessed 29 October 2020).
72 National Police Chiefs Council, Use of Force Monitoring Form: Guidance (2017), p.8, https://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/Guidance%20on%20
Use%20of%20Force%20master%20V2Jan17.pdf, (accessed 18 August 2020).
73 National Police Chiefs Council, Use of Force Monitoring Form: Guidance (2018), pp. 8-9, https://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/Operations/
Guidance%20on%20Use%20of%20Force%20Data%20V4Mar18.pdf, (accessed 18 August 2020).
74 Home Office, Police Use of Force Statistics, England and Wales April 2018 to March 2019, p.22, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/853204/police-use-of-force-apr2018-mar2019-hosb3319.pdf, (accessed 18 August 2020). 
75 National Police Chiefs Council, ‘Police are charged with maintaining order and keeping people safe. In fulfilling those duties, they will sometimes 
need to use force on behalf of the state to protect the public and themselves from harm’, 2017, https://www.npcc.police.uk/ThePoliceChiefsBlog/
Publishinguseofforcedataisagreatstepforwardforforp.aspx, (accessed 18 August 2020).
76 Ibid., p.22.
Home Office data collection and publication
Since 2017, police officers, staff and volunteers, such as 
members of the Special Constabulary, have been required to 
fill out a standardised form whenever they use any form of 
force70. Under these new reporting requirements, a form71 
is to be completed when an officer uses force on any one 
person. If the same officer uses force on multiple people, they 
have to fill out a separate use of force form for each person. 
If multiple officers use force on the same person, each officer 
has to fill out a form documenting their own use of force.
The form includes information about the person on whom 
force is used (including officer perceived gender, ethnicity and 
age) as well as demographic information about the officer 
who used force, the circumstances and the type of force 
used. The form also asks, ‘what subsequently happened to the 
subject’, with an option to record that they died. However, 
there is some ambiguity around whether fatalities should 
be recorded in all cases72 or only in cases where there is a 
suspected causal link between police contact and/or police 
use of force and the death in question73. The Home Office 
publishes a subset of these anonymised statistics, including 
fatalities, on an annual basis74. Police forces are also expected 
to publish quarterly data on their websites75, although this 
does not always happen in practice.
The Home Office statistics for the year in question indicate 
that ‘there were 4 reports of the death of a subject’76. 
However, multiple records may have been submitted for the 
same fatality which makes it difficult to readily identify the 
overall number of deaths. This figure is also markedly different 
from the IOPC figures for the same year.
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Data Quality
IOPC data quality
The IOPC’s methodology, reporting practices, definitions 
and limitations are set out in a detailed guidance document 
which accompanies the publication77 and the IOPC engage 
in internal quality assurance and verification measures. 
According to the guidance document, these include 
checking that all deaths reported are captured and that 
there is no duplication; classifying deaths into the categories 
detailed above using various sources; and validating details 
with the IOPC investigator and police forces. The figures 
produced are designated as national statistics and comply 
with the requirements set out by the Office for National 
Statistics.
In addition to the issues detailed in the previous section, 
there are some data quality issues pertaining to those 
deaths categorised as ‘other’. This category encompasses 
deaths following contact with the police that did not 
involve arrest or detention under the Mental Health Act 
198378. This could include, for example, deaths where the 
police ’help medical staff to restrain individuals who are not 
under arrest’79. 
Such deaths are only included in the annual publication 
if they are subject to an independent investigation. As 
the IOPC note, the criteria for deciding whether an 
independent investigation should be conducted ‘may vary 
over time… (and the) increase in our capacity to carry out 
independent investigations... has had a direct impact on the 
number of deaths reported on in this category. Therefore, 
trend analysis of deaths recorded in this category would 
not be meaningful’80. As such it is possible, in theory, that 
some cases involving the use of force in circumstances 
where the person is not arrested or taken into detention 
under the Mental Health Act may not be included in 
the report. However, the IOPC contended to us that, in 
77 IOPC, Deaths During or Following Police Contact Annual Report: Guidance, 2018, https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Documents/
statistics/Guidance_IOPC_Annual_Death_Report.pdf, (accessed 18 August 2020).
78 IOPC, Deaths During or Following Police Contact: Statistics for England and Wales 2018/19, 2019, p.2, https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/sites/
default/files/Documents/statistics/deaths_during_following_police_contact_201819.pdf, (accessed 18 August 2020).  
79 IOPC, Deaths During or Following Police Contact: Statistics for England and Wales 2018/19, 2019, p.2, https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/sites/
default/files/Documents/statistics/deaths_during_following_police_contact_201819.pdf, (accessed 18 August 2020).  
80 IOPC, Deaths During or Following Police Contact, 2019, p.6.
81 IOPC communication with author, (9 October 2020).
82 Home Office, User Guide to ‘Police Use of Force Statistics, England and Wales’, 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/853006/user-guide-police-use-of-force.pdf, (accessed 18 August 2020).
practice, if police use of force may have been relevant to 
a death, it is highly likely that they would independently 
investigate81.
Home Office statistics
The Home Office’s methodology, reporting practices, 
definitions and limitations are set out in a detailed guidance 
document, or user guide. As noted in the previous section, 
the data comes from the police and quality assurance 
takes place between the Home Office and individual 
police services, with statisticians implementing a range of 
quality assurance checks. This includes querying missing 
or incomplete data and ensuring the data provided is as 
complete as possible82. 
As detailed above, there are concerns that the Home 
Office statistics may over-report the number of deaths 
following police use of force. The Home Office user guide 
also documents a number of concerns about under-
reporting and other inaccuracies. First, they note that 
the statistics are experimental and do not represent all 
use of force in the police agencies covered by the release. 
Secondly, the report only covers the 43 territorial forces 
in England and Wales and does not include other, specialist 
forces. Third, officers are encouraged to submit a use 
of force report as soon as possible after the incident. 
Therefore, any subject fatalities which occur after the 
incident may not be recorded. Fourth, it is possible that a 
form may not be completed in incidents where someone 
has died. The Home Office notes that ‘although all police 
forces do keep records of all fatalities, a fatality caused 
by an officer’s use of force may not have been recorded 
specifically on the police forces’ use of force recording 
system’. Further, ‘where a fatality occurred and a use of 
force report was submitted, the officer involved may not 
have completed the report themselves… As such, these 
incidents often had little other information, as these 
reports were likely submitted by a third-party who was not 
present at the incident and could not provide more than the 
key information’83. 
Relatedly, the Home Office also notes that ‘the data on 
injuries and fatalities is not reported consistently. For 
example, officers may report ‘no injury’ sustained due to  
their use of force, but then also include details of a ‘minor’ 
injury. This could be because officers recorded injuries… 
when these did not occur as a result of the use of force 
incident. The same may be true for the reporting of 
hospitalisations and fatalities’84. 
Data Analysis and Lessons 
Learnt 
Generating analysis and recommendations
Some analysis of the data gathered does take place, for 
example in the Home Office and IOPC reports detailed 
above. There is evidence that some analysis also takes place  
at the local, force level. HMICFRS reports indicate that at 
least 30 services had made some changes to policies and 
practices following the introduction of the use of force 
reporting system85. 
The Home Office notes that its figures do not represent 
the number of deaths caused following use of force. As 
such it is difficult to conduct evidence-based analysis, or to 
make recommendations to prevent future deaths, based on 
this data. Similarly, the analysis and changes to policies and 
practices that HMICFRS documented in individual forces, as 
detailed above, tended to focus on the use of force more 
broadly, and not on cases where a fatality occurred. The 
National Police Chiefs’ Council engaged one of the authors 
of this report (AD) alongside other colleagues from the 
University of Exeter and College of Policing to conduct 
83 Ibid, p.10.
84 Home Office, Police use of force statistics, 2019, p.21.
85 Figures calculated from HMICFRS PEEL Legitimacy Reports for individual police forces in 2017, https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/
publications/peel-police-legitimacy-2017, (accessed 18 August 2020).
86 Published as P. Quinton et al., Police Use of Force: Tactics, Assaults and Safety, College of Policing, 2020, https://paas-s3-broker-prod-lon-6453d964-
1d1a-432a-9260-5e0ba7d2fc51.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2020-09/200818-use-of-force-final-report-1.0.pdf, (accessed 20 September 
2020).
87 For example, IOPC, Learning and Recommendations, undated, https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/research-and-learning/learning-and-recommendations, 
(accessed 18 August 2020).  
88 IOPC communication with author, (9 October 2020).
89 Details of individual investigations can be found at Investigation Summaries and Learning Recommendations, https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/
investigations/investigation-summaries-and-learning-recommendations and Our Investigations, https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/investigations/our-
investigations, (both accessed 29 October 2020).
additional analysis of the new use of force data collected 
under the scheme86. However, this project did not look at 
factors associated with deaths following police use of force 
due to the small number of deaths in the time period in 
question and the quality of this data.
The IOPC publication provides analysis including tables 
detailing the ethnicity, age and gender of those who died 
across each of the categories. Additional information about 
the number of the deceased who were identified as having 
mental health concerns, or were known to have a link to 
drug and/or alcohol use was provided for deaths during or 
following police custody, suicides and other deaths. The 
report contains no recommendations for preventing future 
deaths although the IOPC note that, as it is intended as a 
purely statistical report, it is not the appropriate mechanism 
to do so.   
Instead, the IOPC note that recommendations can be found 
in a variety of other places, including in other publications, 
Learning the Lessons, bulletins and in investigation summaries87, 
and note that they publish formal recommendations issued 
under paragraph 28A of the Police Reform Act 200288. 
Details of IOPC investigations and recommendations can  
also be found on the IOPC website89. While these 
investigations can be searched by a number of variables, 
including the police force or agency involved and the topic 
(with ‘death and serious injury’ and ‘use of force and armed 
policing’ listed as categories), these filters cannot be applied 
simultaneously. As the website also includes details of 
investigations that did not result in recommendations,  
it can also be difficult to find those cases that did result in 
recommendations for change. As a result, recommendations 
that have been made following a death pursuant to a use  
of force are not always immediately apparent.   
England & Wales 
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Learning lessons and implementing regulations
A Ministerial Council on Deaths in Custody was established 
in 200890. It is advised by the Independent Advisory Panel 
on Deaths in Custody and has a remit to ‘bring about a 
continuing and sustained reduction in the number and 
rate of deaths in all forms of state custody in England and 
Wales’91. This is an ongoing challenge. In 2015 the then 
Home Secretary, the Rt. Hon Theresa May MP, announced 
an independent review of deaths and serious incidents in 
police custody (the Report of the Independent Review 
of Deaths and Serious Incidents in Police Custody, also 
referred to as the Report of the Angiolini Review). The 
90 The Ministerial Council on Deaths in Custody replaced the Ministerial Roundtable on Suicide and the Forum for Preventing Deaths in Custody. 
For further detail on the historical context of the Ministerial Council, see the Ministry of Justice, Tailored Review of the Independent Advisory Panel 
on Deaths in Custody, 2017, p.5, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/777178/tailored-
review-of-the-independent-advisory-panel-on-deaths-in-custody.pdf, (accessed 18 August 2020). 
91 Ministry of Justice, Tailored Review of the Independent Advisory Panel on Deaths in Custody, 2017, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/777178/tailored-review-of-the-independent-advisory-panel-on-deaths-in-custody.pdf, 
(accessed 18 August 2020).
92 E. Angiolini, Report of the Independent Review of Deaths and Serious Incidents in Police Custody, 2017, p.13, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/655401/Report_of_Angiolini_Review_ISBN_Accessible.pdf, (accessed 18 August 2020).
establishment of a Ministerial Council and the creation 
of an independent review are important steps towards 
ensuring that lessons are learnt and the risk of future 
deaths are minimised.
However, it is also notable that the Angiolini Report, 
published in 2017, found that there was a ‘failure to 
learn lessons and to properly consider and implement 
recommendations and advice from… interested 
organisations and from previous reports and studies’92. 
Since the Angiolini Report was published, there are further 
indications that this remains an area of concern as indicated 
in the case of Marc Cole, detailed below. 
Learning the Lessons? The Case of Marc Cole
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 requires coroners 
to make reports to a person or organisation where they 
believe that action should be taken to prevent future deaths 
(these are known as Reports to Prevent Future Deaths, or 
Regulation 28 reports). In most cases these reports, and 
responses to them, will be made publicly available, and the 
Office of the Chief Coroner is working to upload reports 
issued since 2013 on their website93. At the time of writing, 
the most recent report pertaining to police use of force 
concerned the death of Marc Cole. 
The jury found that the cause of death was ‘excessive 
cocaine taken resulting in paranoid and erratic behaviour 
with the use of the Taser having more than a trivial impact 
on Mr Cole’s cardiac arrest’. The Coroner’s Regulation 28 
report recommended a ‘wholesale review of the effects 
of multiple Taser activations and the effects of sustained 
activations…so that fuller and more comprehensive advice, 
guidance and training can be given to…officers’94.
In their response to the Regulation 28 report, the College 
of Policing indicated that they ‘keep Taser training under 
regular review and we will carefully examine the findings 
of Mr Cole’s inquest to ensure learning continues to be 
reflected’95. However they also indicated their view that the 
‘current College guidance and learning material address the 
risks associated with the number and duration of Taser 
93 Office of the Chief Coroner, Reports to Prevent Future Deaths, 2020, https://www.judiciary.uk/related-offices-and-bodies/office-chief-coroner/https-
www-judiciary-uk-subject-community-health-care-and-emergency-services-related-deaths, (accessed 25 August 2020).
94 Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Coroner, Regulation 28: Report to Prevent Future Deaths, 2020, https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Marc-
Cole-2020-0087-Redacted.pdf, (accessed 18 August 2020).
95 The College of Policing also note, more broadly, that there is an organisational learning structure embedded within armed policing and that 
revisions are regularly made to the authorised professional practice (i.e. national guidance) and training curriculum as a consequence of learning and 
recommendations. College of Policing communication with author, (16 October 2020).
96 Ibid.
97 College of Policing, Marc Cole: Response from the College of Policing Redacted, 2020, https://www.judiciary.uk/publications/marc-cole, (accessed 18 
August 2020).
98 Home Office, Marc Cole: Response from the Home Office, 2020, https://www.judiciary.uk/publications/marc-cole, (accessed 18 August 2020).
99 E. Ferguson, ‘Family of Falmouth’s Marc Cole React to Taser Report Findings’, The Falmouth Packet, 9 June 2020, https://www.falmouthpacket.co.uk/
news/18504045.family-falmouths-marc-cole-react-taser-report-findings, (accessed 26 October 2020). 
100 L. Dearden, ‘Police Taser Deaths will Rise in UK Unless Action is Taken Coroner Warns’, The Independent, 21 April 2020, https://www.independent.
co.uk/news/uk/home-news/police-taser-deaths-uk-marc-cole-cornwall-coroner-a9477026.html, (accessed 26 October 2020).
activations’96. They expressed concern that they had not 
‘been called to give evidence at the Coroners court’ and 
suggested that ‘there were gaps in the information available 
to the inquest in respect of… the advice the College 
gives on multiple activations, medical implications and first 
aid’97. The Home Office response indicated that they had 
‘carefully reviewed the processes and safeguards in place 
for the police use of Taser... (and are) satisfied that they 
are adequate and help ensure that any use of force by the 
police is proportionate, necessary and as safe as possible’98. 
These responses explicitly state that the system is 
’adequate’ and already ‘address(es) the risks’ identified 
by the Coroner. As such, they do not specify particular 
changes that will be made following the Coroner’s 
recommendation.   
Following these responses, family members of Marc Cole 
have been quoted as saying that ‘we are so angry that 
the Home Office and police are not taking my brother’s 
horrifying death seriously… I was absolutely galled when I 
was told that the Government and the police are refusing 
to change the Taser training’99. The Chief Executive of the 
College of Policing, Mike Cunningham has been quoted as 
saying that ‘we will ensure that our immediate and future 
work is informed by the events that culminated in Mr 
Cole’s tragic death’100.
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In 2018 the government assessed its own progress against 
the Angiolini Report. It found that ‘we have made good 
progress although there remains more to do’101. In 2020, 
Dame Angiolini was quoted expressing her concern ‘that 
many very significant recommendations (from the Review) 
have not been progressed’102.
Investigations by Official 
Agencies 
Investigations
The IOPC is responsible for conducting external 
investigations into deaths following police use of force. Its 
website103 states that ‘we are independent of the police, 
government and interest groups. We investigate the most 
serious and sensitive incidents and allegations involving the 
police in England and Wales’104.
In terms of legal structure and hierarchy, the IOPC has 
a Board which provides ‘advice and challenge to the 
Director General and, with him, sets the strategy for 
the organisation’105 and the Director General is a Crown 
appointment106. In terms of investigative activity, personnel 
and operational ability, the IOPC notes that ‘neither our 
Director General, Director for Wales or any of the 
101 HM Government, Deaths in Police Custody: Progress Update, 2018, p.2, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/763654/181211_DiC_progress_update_HMG_template.pdf, (accessed 26 October 2020).
102 M. Townsend, ‘Report into deaths in custody in England and Wales “kicked into long grass”’, The Observer, 1 November 2020,  
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/nov/01/report-into-deaths-in-custody-in-england-and-wales-kicked-into-long-grass, (accessed 2 
November 2020). 
103 https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/investigations/what-we-investigate-and-next-steps, (accessed 27 October 2020). 
104 As noted in the introduction, while this case study focuses predominantly on the IOPC due to their role collating and publishing statistics 
about deaths during or following police contact, Coroners can also conduct investigations to establish who has died, and how, when, and where 
they died. This investigation may include an inquest and, if the death happened in prison, in police custody or another type of state detention and 
was not from natural causes, the inquest must be heard with a jury. Ministry of Justice, A Guide to Coroner Services for Bereaved People, 2020, p.27, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/859076/guide-to-coroner-services-bereaved-
people-jan-2020.pdf, (accessed 27 October 2020).
105 IOPC, Becoming the IOPC¸ undated, https://policeconduct.gov.uk/becoming-iopc, (accessed 18 August 2020).
106 Policing and Crime Act 2017, Chapter 5, Section 33.
107 IOPC, Becoming the IOPC, undated, https://policeconduct.gov.uk/becoming-iopc, (accessed 18 August 2020).
108 IOPC communication with author, (9 October 2020).
109 Home Affairs Select Committee, House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Independent Police Complaints Commission Eleventh Report of Session 
2012–13, London, 2013.
110 IOPC Who We Are, https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/who-we-are, (accessed 18 August 2020).
111 M.Lockwood, ‘Operation Midland Made Mistakes, but the Presumption of Innocence Must Prevail’, The Guardian, 8 October 2019,  
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/oct/08/mistakes-operation-midland-iopc-investigation-carl-beech, (accessed 18 August 2020).
112 IOPC, Response to the Home Secretary on the Efficiency, Effectiveness and Profile of the IOPC, 2020, pp.2-3, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/867998/Response_to_the_Home_Secretary_on_the_efficiency__effectiveness_
and_profile_of_the_IOPC.pdf and IOPC, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 2019, p.12, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/820239/IOPC-Annual-Report-2018-19.pdf, (accessed 18 August 2020).
Regional Directors have worked for the police in any 
capacity’107. As at 31 March 2020, the IOPC employed 
1,032 staff. 23% of staff overall came from a police 
background (officer and civilian) and 28% of staff in 
Operations came from a police background108.
A Home Affairs Select Committee enquiry into the 
IPCC, the IOPC’s predecessor, found the organisation 
was ‘woefully underequipped and hamstrung in achieving 
its original objectives. It has neither the powers nor the 
resources that it needs to get to the truth… It is not yet 
capable of delivering powerful, objective scrutiny’109. The 
IOPC was launched following reform of the Independent 
Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) in 2018 and has 
doubled in size, taking on six times as many investigations 
compared to 2013110. The IOPC Director General has 
noted that the organisation continues to ‘work through 
many legacy issues, including improving timeliness of 
investigations’111. The IOPC noted that improvements are 
being made in this area, with around 80% of independent 
investigations completed within 12 months and proposals 
submitted to the Ministerial Board on Deaths in Custody 
to improve timeliness across the end-to-end processes 
when someone dies during or following police contact112.
In terms of oversight and control of investigations, the IOPC 
notes that ‘police forces deal with the majority of complaints 
against police officers and police staff’113. When the IOPC 
conducts its own investigations, it determines whether 
there are questions of (gross) misconduct and / or criminal 
conduct to answer but does not determine or control the 
answer to these questions. The IOPC can pass a case to the 
Crown Prosecution Service and, thanks to new powers114, it 
can direct that forces must hold a misconduct hearing and 
can present a case at these hearings – but the outcome of 
such processes is independent of the IOPC. In cases where 
performance issues fall below the threshold for misconduct, 
the IOPC can recommend action. More broadly, it can also 
make organisational learning recommendations and produce 
recommendations both for individual forces and nationally.
A Listening Day held by INQUEST115 involved nine families, 
represented by 18 attendees, who were invited to discuss 
their experiences of the death of a relative following  
contact with the police. INQUEST found that ‘few in  
the room… had positive accounts of investigations’, with 
families raising concerns including evidence gathering, 
inconsistent approaches to interviewing officers, delays  
and a failure to involve families during the investigation116.  
The IOPC state that, since this Listening Day, they have  
made various improvements, including holding their own 
listening days with bereaved families, appointing Family  
Liaison Officers and expanding and strengthening the 
Stakeholder Engagement Team117.
113 IOPC, Who We Are, https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/who-we-are, (accessed 18 August 2020).
114 IOPC, Becoming the IOPC, undated, https://policeconduct.gov.uk/becoming-iopc, (accessed 29 October 2020).
115 INQUEST are the only charity in England and Wales providing expertise on state related deaths and their investigation, www.inquest.org.uk, 
(accessed 29 October 2020).
116 INQUEST, INQUEST report of the Family Listening Day for the Independent Police Complaints Commission, 2018, p.14, https://www.inquest.org.uk/
Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=6df8ac79-3c8a-4fc9-8761-289d1d652558, (accessed 18 August 2020).
117 IOPC communication with author, dated 09/10/2020.
118 College of Policing, Police Dismissals (Home Office Forces), 2019, https://www.college.police.uk/News/College-news/Documents/Barred_List_2019.pdf, 
(accessed 18 August 2020).
119 In practice, this may depend on space and capacity limitations.
120 See also D. Baker, ‘Researching Deaths after Police Contact: Challenges and Solutions’, Journal of Criminological Research, Policy and Practice, vol. 2,  
no. 1, 2016, pp.15-27.
121 E. Angiolini, Report of the Independent Review of Deaths and Serious Incidents in Police Custody, 2017, pp.24-25, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/655401/Report_of_Angiolini_Review_ISBN_Accessible.pdf, (accessed 18 August 2020).
Legal proceedings, prosecutions and convictions
From 2017, the 43 Home Office services must provide 
the College of Policing with details of officers, staff and 
others who have been dismissed, including following gross 
misconduct hearings. The College of Policing publishes overall 
figures, and a publicly searchable database, based on these 
reports. This reveals that, in March 2018 – 2019, 11 officers 
were dismissed due to ‘excess force’118. 
It is more difficult to find comprehensive information 
about legal proceedings, prosecutions and convictions. 
While members of the public can attend police disciplinary 
hearings119 , court cases and inquests, details of these 
proceedings are often not freely or publicly available to those 
who were unable to attend on the day120. It can be difficult 
to find a comprehensive list of outcomes (prosecutions, 
disciplinary hearings, inquest conclusions) for all cases 
following police use of force, in particular if one does not 
know the name of the individuals involved. However, the 
2017 Angiolini Report notes that:
Of eight prosecutions of police officers in connection with 
a death in custody in the last 15 years all have ended with 
acquittals…there has never been a successful prosecution 
for manslaughter in such cases, despite unlawful killing 
verdicts in Coroner’s Inquests121. 
At the time of writing, the Crown Prosecution Service has 
charged an officer with murder following the use of force 
in the death of Dalian Atkinson, with a second officer being 
charged with assault causing actual bodily harm. This is as a 
result of an IOPC investigation. The case is yet to come to 
court at the time of writing.
England & Wales 
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There have been two cases where police forces (Devon 
and Cornwall Police and the Metropolitan Police Service) 
were found, or pleaded, guilty under the Health and Safety 
Act, following the deaths of Thomas Orchard and Jean 
Charles De Menezes, respectively122.
Non-official Sources and 
Analysis
A number of non-official sources provide statistics on 
deaths following police contact, or in police custody. These 
may include deaths following police use of force, though 
such deaths are not always readily identifiable. Sources 
include, but are not limited to, the following:
•  The NGO INQUEST, which provides figures that cover 
deaths that happen ‘while the individual is in contact with 
police… or that happen shortly after’. Their figures are 
from ‘our monitoring and casework and are independent’ 
of the Home Office and IOPC’123. 
•  The Institute of Race Relations (IRR) ‘publish a list of 
BAME, refugee and migrant deaths in custody from 2014 
– 2020 that took place in prison, in immigration detention 
or involving police’. They state that the ‘list has been 
compiled by IRR, using IRR News coverage and media 
releases by the organisation Inquest’124.
•  The Independent Advisory Panel (IAP) on deaths in 
custody has conducted analysis of recorded deaths in 
state custody between 2000 – 2013125 and state that  
a report for 2016 – 2019 is due for publication later  
this year.
122 INQUEST, ‘Hearing for Health and Safety prosecution of Devon and Cornwall Police to determine whether breaches caused Thomas 
Orchard’s death’, 2019, https://www.inquest.org.uk/thomas-orchard-newton-hearing, (accessed 29 October 2020).
123 INQUEST, Deaths in Police Custody, 2020, https://www.inquest.org.uk/deaths-in-police-custody, (accessed 18 August 2020).
124 Institute of Race Relations, BAME, Refugee and Migrant Deaths in Custody (2014 – 2020), 2020, https://irr.org.uk/research/deaths/bame-refugee-
and-migrant-deaths-in-custody-2014-2020, (accessed 20 September 2020).
125 Independent Advisory Panel of Deaths in Custody, Statistics, undated, http://iapdeathsincustody.independent.gov.uk/work-of-the-iap/statistics, 
(accessed 18 August 2020).
126 BBC News, ‘George Floyd death: How many black people die in police custody in England and Wales?’, 3 June 2020 edition,  
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/52890363, (accessed 20 September 2020).
127 Action on Armed Violence, ‘One in Four Shot by UK Police are Black, yet Tiny Fraction of Armed Officers are Black’, 2020, https://aoav.org.
uk/2020/one-in-four-shot-by-uk-police-are-black-yet-tiny-fraction-of-armed-officers-are-black-study-finds, (accessed 26 October 2020).
•  A BBC analysis of deaths in or following police custody 
as reported by the IOPC over the last 10 years found 
that 164 people had died, of whom ‘141 were white; 13 
were black; 10 were from other minority ethnic groups’. 
They compared these figures to the 2011 census and 
found that ‘black people are more than twice as likely to 
die in police custody’126. However, the BBC analysis also 
indicated that 79% of those arrested, and 85% of those 
who died in custody, were white. 9% of people arrested 
and 8% of those who died in custody were black. They 
calculated that, ‘over the last 10 years, a white individual 
who has been arrested was about 25% more likely to die 
in custody than a black individual who had been arrested’.
•  A study by Action on Armed Violence found that ‘a 
quarter of people shot by armed police forces in England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland in the last five years were 
black… Out of 31 incidents since 2015 – excluding live 
terrorist events – eight of those shot by officers were 
black, including three killed and five wounded. This 
constitutes 26% of the total shootings’127.
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Recommendations
128 HM Government, Deaths in Police Custody: Progress Update, 2018, p.2, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/763654/181211_DiC_progress_update_HMG_template.pdf, (accessed 26 October 2020).
129 D. Baker, Deaths After Police Contact Constructing Accountability in the 21st Century, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p.207.
Certain features of the English and Welsh system constitute 
relatively good practice when looked at internationally. 
However, in an area as important as deaths following police 
use of force, there is no room for complacency and as the 
government has recognised, ‘there remains more to do’128. 
Consequently, our recommendations include the following. 
1)  While much information is published, there is a 
need to enhance data collection and publication, 
particularly as sources of information and 
recommendations pertaining to this crucial 
area can be disparate, difficult to find and 
difficult to collate. We recommend that:     
•  Police forces publish use of force data quarterly, 
including but not limited to fatalities.
•  The Crown Prosecution Service track and publish 
statistics on the outcomes of cases relating to police  
use of force (particularly, but not limited to, cases  
where death has occurred) to allow for the tracking  
of prosecutions, convictions, appeals and sentences in 
such cases.
•  The IOPC more clearly disaggregate deaths following 
police use of force in its Deaths During or Following 
Police Contact report. While we appreciate that the 
report has to appeal to a range of audiences and 
contain information about a wide range of deaths, not 
only those where force is used, and there is a balance 
to be struck between detail and readability, additional 
information would be useful and could perhaps be 
included in the appendix.
•  The IOPC signpost and cross-reference to 
relevant publications and investigation summaries, 
recommendations and responses to recommendations 
in Deaths During or Following Police Contact. There 
are many investigation summaries that may contain 
recommendations where deaths have followed police 
use of force and a way of readily identifying these would 
be advantageous.
•  Where possible, the IOPC publish details of all 
recommendations made following investigations into 
deaths subsequent to police use of force and responses  
to them, irrespective of which section of the Police 
Reform Act they were issued under.    
•  Transparency around Inquests is enhanced in cases 
where force has been used, with Regulation 28 reports 
classified according to whether police use of force was 
involved, and transcripts of proceedings and jury verdicts 
made available. While Jury verdicts can be requested 
from the Coroner’s court, this necessitates knowing 
where and when the inquest was heard and the name of 
the deceased. Similarly, it is currently difficult for those 
who are unable to attend Inquest hearings on the day in 
question to receive a record of proceedings.
•  Alternatively, given the multiple recommendations for 
multiple organisations listed above, the government 
should consider creating one central hub to capture 
such details, trace deaths pursuant to police use of 
force and collate relevant documentation, outcomes and 
implementation measures in one place (see also previous 
recommendation for a database to capture inputs from 
the coronial system and the IPCC129). The Angiolini 
Report’s proposal for an Office for Article 2 compliance 
could have a useful role to play in compiling such data, 
amongst other functions, but in the meantime, we 
suggest that the measures detailed above would be 
useful steps. Please refer to recommendation 3 for 
further detail about the Office for Article 2 compliance.  
2)  We recommend that data quality is  
enhanced by:
•  Improving clarity around when fatalities should be 
recorded on the NPCC and Home Office use of force 
form and minimising discrepancies between IOPC and 
Home Office figures.    
•  Clearly identifying in IOPC and Home Office 
publications cases where deaths have followed police 
use of force, as detailed in recommendation 1.
3)  We recommend that data analysis, investigations 
and lessons learned are enhanced by:
•  The IOPC undertaking to independently investigate 
all deaths where use of force may have caused or 
contributed to the fatality and to clarify this on their 
website.    
•  Relevant agencies working together to implement the 
recommendations of the Independent Advisory Panel 
on Deaths in Custody in September 2020, including 
that ‘cross-cutting, collaborative work must be carried 
forward to ensure learning from deaths, and specifically 
coroners’ prevention of future deaths reports, are 
appropriately disseminated and embedded into policy  
and practice’130. 
130 Independent Advisory Panel on Deaths in Custody submission to the Justice Select Committee inquiry on the Coroner Service, September, 
2020, p.1, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5c5ae65ed86cc93b6c1e19a3/t/5f6b37f6e0bddb2c75d764e6/1600862203091/200902+IAP+JSC+co
roners+service+evidence+-+September+2020+-+final+to+submit.pdf, (accessed 26 October 2020).
•  Relevant agencies working together to implement the 
recommendations of the Report of the Independent 
Review of Deaths and Serious Incidents in Police 
Custody (also known as the Angiolini Report), 
where these remain outstanding. With over 100 
recommendations, there is not space to outline all 
of them here, but they include recommendations 
on the use of force and restraint (recommendations 
1 – 7), recommendations to introduce non-means 
tested legal advice, assistance and representation for 
bereaved families (recommendation 33) and greater 
involvement, engagement and communication with 
families both around the investigations and subsequent 
hearings (see, for example, recommendations 40, 47, 
81) and around the training delivered by the police, 
the IOPC and other bodies (recommendations 88 
and 94 - 5). The recommendation to create an Office 
for Article 2 compliance (recommendation 100) also 
advises that it ‘be accountable to Parliament, and 
tasked with the collation and dissemination of learning, 
the implementation and monitoring of that learning, 
and monitoring the consistency of its application 
at a national level. It should report publicly on the 
accumulated learning, and compliance arising from 
Inquest outcomes and recommendations. It should 
provide a route for bereaved families and community 
groups to voice their concerns and help provide a 
mandate for its work’.
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France
Police Gendarmerie
1.  Are the number of deaths following any police use of force (be it firearms, ‘less lethal’ weapons or other force): 
Collected? G U
Publicly available? G N
Is this a legal requirement? N N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? N N
2.  If published, to what extent is the number of deaths readily identifiable from 
official statistics? What work needs to be done to pull these out?
G N
3. Are the deceased identified by name? N N
4.  Is demographic and other information for the deceased (including ethnic background, age and gender):
Collected? U U
Publicly available? N N
Is this a legal requirement? N N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? N N
5. Is demographic and other information for LEOs:
Collected? U U
Publicly available? N N
Is this a legal requirement? N N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? N N
6. Is information on the circumstances:
Collected? U U
Publicly available? N N
Is this a legal requirement? N N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? N N
7. Is information about the type(s) of force used:
U U
Publicly available? N N
Is this a legal requirement? N N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? N N
Data Quality of Official Sources
8. How reliable are the sources used to produce official statistics about deaths? L N
9. Internal quality assurance / verification conducted U N
10. Methodology for data collection publicly specified  P N
11. How reliable are the overall figures produced? P N
Police Gendarmerie
Data Analysis and Lessons Learnt
12. State / police agencies analyse data to generate evidence-based 
recommendations / lessons learnt, in order to prevent future deaths
U U
13. Evidence that state / police agencies act on the results of their analysis, 
including applying lessons learnt
N N
14. External bodies are able to reuse data for their own analyses N
15. External, non-governmental agencies collect, and are able to publish, their  
own statistics on deaths following police use of force
G G
Investigations by Official Agencies
16. Is there a legal requirement for deaths to be independently investigated? N N
▲ ★
18. How independent are the investigations conducted by the organisation(s) 
named above? Please consider the extent to which they are independent and 
separate in terms of a) legal structure, b) hierarchy, c) investigative activity and 
personnel, d) operational ability (or ‘self-reliance’) e) oversight and control
N N
19. Involvement of close relatives in the investigations L L
20. Investigation reports into deaths are:
Publicly available? N N
Do they give reasons for the conclusions they have reached? N N
Is this a legal requirement? N N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? N N
21. Information available on legal proceedings against agents / officials pursuant  
to deaths
N N
22. Information available on legal proceedings against state agencies pursuant  
to deaths
N N
23. Information available on disciplinary proceedings against agents / officials 
pursuant to deaths
L N
24. Number of prosecutions against agents / officials involved in the last ten years? N N
25. Number of convictions against agents / officials involved in the last ten years? N N
26. Number of prosecutions against agencies involved in the last ten years? N N
27. Number of convictions against agencies involved in the last ten years? N N










G L N UP
Data Collection and Publication by Official Agencies
Based on the 2018 reporting period (calendar year)
Collected?131
131 The reference year used for this table is 2018. However, it 
should be noted that this information has changed slightly in 
2019: the IGPN’s annual report for 2019 includes information 
relating to the “cause of death” (i.e. the type of force used).  
17. Is there an authority, separate from the one involved in the incident, 
which conducts investigations into deaths? If so, which organisation(s) 
conduct these investigations?132
132 The table mentions here only the Official Agencies competent to conduct judicial and 
disciplinary investigations. It does not include the Defender of Rights, an independent 
authority, which may also carry out investigations but is not competent to conduct judicial 
or disciplinary inquiries.  
▲  IGPN or police services
★  IGGN or gendarmerie services
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French law enforcement agencies are divided into two 
main bodies: the national police (“Police”) and the national 
gendarmerie (“Gendarmerie”). The gendarmerie is an army 
corps, and the gendarmes are therefore military personnel.
There are currently approximately 150,000 police officers 
and 100,000 gendarmes. Police officers are traditionally 
assigned to urban areas (cities with more than 20,000 
inhabitants), while gendarmes operate in rural areas. In 
total, the national gendarmerie covers 95 per cent of the 
territory and 50 per cent of the population. Both have 
been under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior 
since 2009. In addition to these two main bodies, there is 
also the municipal police in France (approximately 23,000 
officers133), whose establishment and management is the 
responsibility of the mayor of each municipality. Municipal 
police officers are territorial civil servants of communes and 
intercommunal bodies.
This report only deals in-depth with the actions of the 
national security forces (national police and gendarmerie), 
which are the two main law enforcement agencies in the 
country, and are moreover the security forces that most 
often use force. The reporting period used in this report 
is based on a calendar year. It assesses the information 
available pertaining to 2018 and 2019.  
It should be noted with regard to municipal police officers 
that, while they are rarely involved in cases involving the 
use of force, they nevertheless have the possibility of being 
armed and of using force in certain circumstances134. The 
French government publishes precise data on the number 
of municipal police officers and the number and type of 
weapons they carry135. However, to date, there is no public 
information on cases of possible use of physical force or 
weapons by these officers, nor is there any information on 
disciplinary and/or judicial investigations in such cases. 
133 The French government lists 22,780 agents in 2018: Ministry of Interior, Police municipale : Effectifs par commune, 2018,  
https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/datasets/police-municipale-effectifs-par-commune, (accessed 4 August 2020).
134 Each mayor who wishes to do so may decide to arm his municipal police (with tear gas grenades, rubber bullet launchers (LBD or ‘flashball’), 
Tasers and/or firearms), by requesting authorisation from the Préfet.    
135 The Government publishes a table listing all the municipalities that have established a municipal police force, the number of officers assigned 
to each municipality and the number and type of weapons equipping each of these municipal police forces. As of 1 January 2019, 53% (12,143) of 
municipal police officers were equipped with a firearm, 16.5% were equipped with a flashball (3,775) and 14% had a Taser (3,167): A. Léchenet and 
H. Jouanneau, ‘Police municipale: l’armement en cartes et en chiffres’, La Gazette des communes, 10 February 2020,  
https://www.lagazettedescommunes.com/661973/police-municipale-larmement-en-cartes-et-en-chiffres, (accessed 4 August 2020).
136 The role and missions of the IGPN are presented in detail in the annual report of the Inspectorate; for example, see the IGPN’s report for 2019.
Data Collection and Publication 
by Official Agencies
The French authorities have only very recently begun 
officially counting the number of people “injured or killed” 
during police interventions. However, the information 
published is incomplete and the census is also partial 
since it concerns only the National Police. The National 
Gendarmerie does not yet carry out any official data 
collection.
National Police
For the National Police, the official census is carried out 
by the Inspection générale de la Police nationale (IGPN – 
General Inspectorate of the National Police). Composed 
exclusively of police officers, the IGPN is an active service 
of the General Directorate of the National Police, under 
whose direction it is placed. The IGPN has a double role, 
covering both general auditing of police services and 
the control of police personnel136. In the latter role, it 
ensures that police officers comply with national laws and 
regulations and the police code of ethics and is, for this 
reason, commonly referred to as the “police of police”. 
It investigates disciplinary and criminal cases concerning 
police officers, in particular in the context of investigations 
entrusted to it by the administrative and judicial authorities. 
However, it has no direct power of sanction: the decision 
to impose a disciplinary sanction rests with the hierarchical 
authorities of the Ministry of the Interior. 
The recording of cases of persons who have died during a 
police intervention is not a legal obligation in France. Since 
2017, the IGPN has recorded cases of injuries and deaths 
France 
occurring during police operations. Inaugurated through an 
experimental phase starting in July 2017, the census tool 
(known as the “census of injured or dead individuals137) was 
subsequently extended to all police services from January 
2018. The data are presented in the annual Inspectorate’s 
report, which is accessible on the Internet138. On the basis 
of this tool, the IGPN reports 15 deaths (and 106 injuries) in 
2018, then 19 deaths (and 117 injuries) in 2019.  
However, the published data is highly limited in scope. 
In 2018, only the total number of recorded injuries and 
fatalities was made public, excluding any factual or analytical 
information about the recorded fatalities (name, location, 
ethnicity, age, sex, circumstances of death, type of force 
used). There is a slight change in the activity report for  
2019, which provides additional information on “causes of 
death”. Thus, we learn there that the majority of deaths 
were caused by the use of a weapon. Apart from this new 
information, the IGPN does not publish any information on 
the circumstances of the death or injury, or on the place 
(city, region) where it occurred. Deceased persons are not 
identified by name and no other biographical data (age, 
gender, etc.) is provided. It is therefore impossible to know 
which cases are or are not recorded and to cross-check  
with public sources of information. 
In addition to this, the possibilities for citizens to request 
information on the use of police force are very limited. In the 
absence of a freedom of information act, the only possibility 
for a citizen to access unpublished administrative documents 
is to refer the matter to the Commission for Access to 
Administrative Documents (CADA). However, seized by a 
journalist, the CADA considered that the IGPN is not obliged 
to make public a study it carried out in 2017 on the use of 
weapons in the police139.
137 “Recensement des particuliers blessés ou décédés” (RBD) in French.
138 IGPN, IGPN Annual Report for 2018, 17 June 2019 and IGPN Annual Report for 2019, 8 June 2020.
139 C. Polloni, ‘La Cada dit qu’elle ne voit pas le rapport (de l’IGPN)’, Médiapart, 24 February 2020, https://blogs.mediapart.fr/camille-polloni/
blog/240220/la-cada-dit-qu-elle-ne-voit-pas-le-rapport-de-l-igpn, (accessed 27 October 2020).
140 S. Roché, ‘Les violences policières en France’, Revue Esprit, January 2020.
141 Translated from French. “Depuis le 1er janvier 2018, une application est alimentée par les déclarations provenant des délégations de l’IGPN et de 
l’ensemble des services de police.” IGPN Annual Report for 2018, p.30. 
National Gendarmerie
Even though this corps covers half of the population and 
includes 100,000 agents, the National Gendarmerie does 
not provide any information about its use of force. It does 
not publish an annual report or provide any information on 
cases of injuries and deaths during its operations. To the 
best of our current knowledge, there is no internal tool for 
identifying individuals injured or killed. Only a few scattered 
figures, communicated sporadically, provide rare indications. 
For example, the IGGN agreed to provide the researcher 
Sebastian Roché, upon his request, with the number of 
individuals killed during gendarmerie operations in 2018. 
Roché reported that the Gendarmerie recorded five deaths 
“by use of a weapon” in 2018, with no further information 
being provided on the circumstances, dates and location of 
death, the identity of the deceased or the methodology used 
to account for these cases140. 
Data Quality 
In the absence of data compiled and published by the 
National Gendarmerie, in this section we only deal with 
information relating to deaths occurring during National 
Police operations. The reports of the IGPN provide little 
information on the methodology used and the practical 
details of this census. The database is fed by “statements 
from the IGPN delegations and from all police services”141. 
It is therefore based on the police services themselves, 
on a declarative basis, without any further details. These 
reports do not make it possible to know in practice who 
is responsible for filling out the database (for instance, 
field agents, IGPN inspectors, etc.), nor what training 
and methodological framework has been provided to 
the individuals concerned, nor what controls are carried 
out to monitor the database’s input. We do not have any 
information on any internal checks that may have been 
carried out. 
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The IGPN’s reports for 2018 and 2019 only provide  
details on the types of deaths included in this census.  
It includes142:
•  Events (injuries or deaths) that occurred “during a police 
mission”;
•  Events that have “led to the opening of a judicial inquiry 
(following a complaint by the person concerned, a death 
investigation, an arrest...)”;
•  In the case of injury(ies), facts for which the temporary 
interruption of work is “at least equal to or greater than 
9 days and established by a medical certificate drawn up 
by a forensic doctor”.
Furthermore, we have no precise information on the scope 
of the missions concerned, as the term “during a police 
mission” is imprecise. The information made public does 
not, for example, make it possible to know whether deaths 
occurring during car chases are recorded in this database, 
nor do we know whether deaths occurring after an arrest 
(but potentially related to the arrest) are recorded in this 
database (e.g. people who died in hospital when no longer 
in police custody).  
142 Translated from French. “Le traitement retient trois conditions cumulatives: Les faits (blessures ou décès) se sont produits à l’occasion d’une 
mission de police ; Les faits ont donné lieu à l’ouverture d’une enquête judiciaire (à la suite d’une plainte de l’intéressé, d’une enquête décès, d’une 
interpellation…); Dans le cas de blessure(s), l’ITT est au moins égale ou supérieure à 9 jours et constatée par un certificat médical rédigé par un 
médecin médico-judiciaire.” IGPN Annual Report for 2018, p.30. 
143 J. Pascual, ‘La police va enfin recenser les cas de violences policières’, Le Monde, 6 April 2016, https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/
article/2016/04/07/la-police-va-enfin-recenser-les-cas-de-violences-policieres_4897384_1653578.html, (accessed 14 April 2020). 
144 Translated from French. “Jusqu’en 2017, faute d’un outil institutionnel de recensement, il n’était pas possible de fournir des données fiables sur 
les personnes blessées ou décédées à l’occasion des missions de police (…). Cet état de fait favorisait la diffusion d’informations souffrant d’un 
manque de rigueur et d’objectivité et conduisait certains commentateurs à assimiler l’usage de la force physique ou armée à des violences policières, 
voire à des bavures”. IGPN Annual Report for 2018, p.30.
145 Translated from French. “Dans plus d’un tiers des cas, le décès résulte du comportement direct du particulier ou de son état physique 
(problème de santé, malaise généré par l’alcool ou les stupéfiants...).” IGPN Annual Report for 2019, p.22.
Data Analysis and  
Lessons Learnt 
The French police do not publish any detailed analysis of 
the data collected on the number of deaths. It does not 
make any public recommendations based on its census 
and does not draw – at least publicly – any lessons from 
the data that would be aimed at preventing future deaths. 
Moreover, the data that could support this purpose do not 
appear to be collected. 
The National Police census tool was created in a very 
specific context. The lack of transparency of the French 
police is regularly the subject of strong criticism, both from 
civil society and from segments of the population. It is in 
this context of tension that the IGPN announced, in 2016, 
that it intended to set up a system to record the number 
of people injured or killed during police interventions143,  
a decision that it justified by the need to combat the 
dissemination of information “that lacked rigour and 
objectivity”144. At no time was the justification put  
forward for the creation of this database stated to be  
the prevention of future deaths. 
On the contrary, several elements of the IGPN’s report 
for 2019 question the real willingness of the institution to 
change its practices and learn from the deaths that have 
occurred. Thus, concerning the aforementioned 19 deaths 
listed for 2019, the report hastens to assert – without 
specifying the data on which this assertion is based – that 
“in more than a third of cases, the death results from 
the direct behaviour of the individual or from his physical 
condition (health problem, negative reaction to alcohol or 
drugs)”, thus seeming to seek to exclude the responsibility 
of law enforcement agencies for part of the deaths listed145. 
Moreover, this statement is followed by another, specifying 
that death is not necessarily related to the use of force but 
may result from an “exogenous” cause: “It is important to 
specify that the use of arrest and restraint techniques or 
of electrical discharge weapons does not necessarily imply 
a direct link between these uses and death, which may be 
caused by an exogenous cause”146. In the preceding pages, the 
IGPN also calls for the development of the use of electrical 
discharge weapons (Taser) to “neutralize an individual in a 
state of high agitation without using restraint techniques 
requiring the physical intervention of the law enforcement 
agencies”147, even though the use of this type of weapon in 
these precise circumstances is considered dangerous and 
potentially lethal by many authorities (for instance, European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture148, Defender of 
Rights149) or NGOs150, and even though the Inspectorate 
recorded at least one death in 2019 in France after this 
weapon was used.  
Since no biographical data or data on the circumstances of 
the deaths recorded are published, external bodies are not in 
a position to re-use these official data for their own analysis, 
with the sole exception of the number of deaths recorded. 
The weakness of the published information does not allow an 
external counter-analysis. Unofficial sources carry out their 
own counting by investigating from information provided in 
the media. Some activist groups, families of victims, journalists 
and NGOs publish reports or analysis on certain cases of 
death. A more accurate and complete account is carried out 
by the independent newspaper Bastamag, which, on the basis 
of a thorough investigation, publishes and updates its own 
statistics (see below under non-official sources).
146 Translated from French. “Il est important de préciser que l’utilisation de techniques de sécurité en intervention ou du pistolet à impulsion électrique 
n’emporte pas pour autant un lien direct entre ces usages et le décès, lequel peut être provoqué par une cause exogène”. IGPN Report for 2019,  
p.22. 
147 Translated from French. “[Le] développement [du pistolet à impulsion électrique] pourrait constituer une alternative pertinente pour neutraliser un 
individu en état de forte agitation sans faire usage de techniques de sécurité en intervention justifiant l’intervention physique des forces de l’ordre”. IGPN 
Annual Report for 2019, p.21.
148 Council of Europe, 20th General Report on the CPT’s Activities (2009-2010), § 79.
149 Défenseur des droits, Rapport sur trois moyens de force intermédiaire, May 2013, p.18.
150 Amnesty International, USA, Life, liberty and the pursuit of human rights. A submission to the UN Human Rights committee, September 2013,  
p.23 ; ACAT, L’ordre et la force. Enquête sur l’usage de la force par les représentants de la loi en France, 2016, pp.43-46.
151 Translated from French. “Le recours à l’arme létale, qu’il s’avère in fine légitime ou non, entraîne généralement l’ouverture d’une enquête judiciaire 
souvent confiée à l’IGPN”. IGPN Annual Report for 2019, p.9. 
Investigations by Official 
Agencies 
Information on investigations
International law obliges States to conduct an effective 
investigation as soon as there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that ill-treatment or torture has been committed, 
or as soon as the use of force has resulted in the death of a 
person. However, this obligation is not codified in French law. 
There is no provision in the code of ethics of the police and 
gendarmerie nor in the decree relating to the missions and 
organization of the IGPN that obliges the State to investigate 
cases of deaths occurring during interventions by the security 
forces. The IGPN report states only that “the use of a lethal 
weapon (...) usually leads to a criminal investigation”151.
In practice, judicial investigations into allegations of unlawful 
use of force (injury and death) are conducted either by 
conventional police or gendarmerie services, or by the IGPN 
(in the case of the police) or the IGGN (gendarmerie). When 
a case is referred to the IGPN or IGGN, the investigation 
is carried out either by the services of a regional office or 
by the central office located in Paris. However, no text 
or information makes it possible to know precisely how 
investigations are divided between the police services and 
the IGPN (or IGGN). Similarly, when investigations are 
entrusted to the Inspectorates (IGPN or IGGN), there is no 
information on which cases fall under the jurisdiction of the 
regional offices and which fall under the jurisdiction of the 
central office.  
In all cases, the independence of these bodies is disputed: 
both Inspectorates are composed exclusively of police 
officers (IGPN) or gendarmes (IGGN), and come under the 
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authority of the National Police Directorate (or the 
National Gendarmerie), on which they are hierarchically 
dependent. Political scientist Sebastian Roché sums it up as 
follows: 
The IGPN is by law a department of the Ministry, 
organically attached to the Ministry, whose officers are 
exclusively agents of the Ministry, which pays them, gives 
them bonuses and their future assignment. The orders 
to audit come from the Minister. Orders to investigate 
administratively also. Moreover, they share a professional 
police identity, which introduces bias into the judgments. 
The IGPN is therefore dependent on the police 
hierarchy and culture152. 
As a result of this institutional dependence, these bodies 
are suspected of bias. 
Added to this, relatives of the deceased are not “involved” 
in the investigations. They are only heard as complainants 
or witnesses. The complainants (civil parties) can ask the 
judge to carry out certain acts of investigation (hearing 
witnesses, reconstitution, viewing of videos), but several 
civil society surveys report that it is very difficult for 
families to obtain these acts of investigation153. 
These suspicions of bias are not dispelled by the lack of 
transparency of the two Inspectorates as to the results 
of their investigations: the IGPN and IGGN investigation 
reports are not made public. In the case of disciplinary 
investigation reports, the institution considers that the 
investigation, which is exclusively internal, does not have 
to be communicated to the public or to the families of 
the victims. Reports of judicial inquiries are placed in the 
judicial file but are not made public.  
Only the investigations of certain journalists provide access 
to information from these reports. In the first work of its 
152 Translated from French: “l’IGPN est par la loi un service du ministère, rattaché organiquement au ministère, dont les agents sont exclusivement 
des agents du ministère, qui les paie, leur donne des primes et leur futur affectation. Les ordres d’auditer viennent du ministre. Les ordres 
d’enquêter administrativement aussi. Par ailleurs, ils partagent une identité professionnelle policière, ce qui introduit des biais dans les jugements. 
L’IGPN est donc dépendante à la hiérarchie et à la culture policière.” D. Dufresne, ‘Sept ans de rapports IGPN analysés: Une absence de sincérité 
dans la recherche de la transparence’, Médiapart, 12 June 2020, https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/120620/sept-ans-de-rapports-igpn-
analyses-une-absence-de-sincerite-dans-la-recherche-de-la-transparence, (accessed 2 August 2020).    
153 ACAT, L’ordre et la force. Enquête sur l’usage de la force par les représentants de la loi en France, 2016, pp.75-82. 
154 For detailed survey results see D. Dufresne, ‘Allô IGPN? Que fait (vraiment) la police des polices?’, 13 June 2020, http://www.davduf.net/allo-
igpn-que-fait-vraiment-la-police-des-polices, (accessed 2 August 2020). See also D. Dufresne and P. Pasceriello, ‘IGPN: plongée dans la fabrique  
de l’impunité’, Médiapart, 13 June 2020, https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/120620/igpn-plongee-dans-la-fabrique-de-l-impunite,  
(accessed 2 August 2020).
kind, in June 2020, journalist David Dufresne published 
the results of a six-month investigation during which 
he examined and analysed in detail 65 IGPN files and 
compared successive annual inspection reports. The results 
showed that a significant proportion of the cases followed 
up were closed and David Dufresne observes in these 
investigations several repetitive elements that contribute to 
what he calls the “factory of impunity” (investigations not 
carried out in depth, failure to identify the police officers 
involved, video or radio recordings not seized, failure to 
carry out ballistic examination of weapons, disappearance 
of evidence, failure to interview police officers, software 
listing police computer reports truncated, etc.)154. 
In addition to the “official” investigations of the IGPN 
and IGGN, there are also investigations carried out by 
the Defender of Rights. This independent human rights 
institution (Ombudsman) can be called upon to investigate 
matters relating to the ethics of the security forces and 
the use of police force and has broad investigative powers 
(interview witnesses, police officers, victims; view video 
footage; request the communication of any document, 
etc.). At the end of the investigation, he issues an opinion 
which is transmitted to the Ministry of the Interior, in 
which he provides his view on the possible responsibility 
of the officers involved and can, if necessary, recommend 
disciplinary sanctions. Unlike the investigation reports of 
the IGPN and the IGGN, his decisions are made public 
and accessible on the institution’s website. However, 
these opinions are advisory and do not bind the Minister 
of the Interior, who remains the sole decision-maker on 
the sanction. The opinions of the Defender of Rights are 
rarely followed by the competent authorities. In his own 
activity report for 2019, the Defender of Rights states that 
“since the beginning of his mandate, (he) has requested 
disciplinary proceedings in 36 cases. However, none of his 
requests, although rare and detailed in relation to the number 
of cases handled over the same period (3987 complaints, or 
1%), have been acted upon”155. 
Information available on legal or disciplinary 
proceedings and number of prosecutions  
and convictions
In its annual activity report, the IGPN reports on the number 
of judicial and disciplinary investigations initiated against 
police officers. In 2019, it received 1,460 judicial investigations 
(including 868 for intentional violence) and 224 administrative 
investigations. All categories combined, the IGPN proposed 
276 disciplinary sanctions, including 117 Disciplinary Boards. 
Sanctions are then decided by the General Police Directorate. 
The IGPN’s annual report informs the public that in 2019, 
the police institution issued 1678 sanctions against officers, 
including a large majority of warnings (900) and reprimands 
(595). However, the information published does not allow 
us to know which field of police ethics these sanctions 
concern. In view of the information provided, it is therefore 
not possible to know what sanctions may have been issued in 
cases leading to deaths.
As regards the National Gendarmerie, we have no public 
information on the investigative activities of the Inspectorate 
or on the disciplinary activity of the institution. 
No official information is published on court cases involving 
officers from either the Police or the Gendarmerie. It is 
currently impossible to know the number of prosecutions 
of officers for acts of violence over the last ten years. Lastly, 
no official statistics are available on the outcome of these 
prosecutions or on any convictions (number and quantum of 
sentences). The rare information on judicial decisions about 
cases involving police officers for the use of force is published 
by activist groups, families of victims, NGOs and journalists. 
In June 2020, the newspaper Bastamag published the results 
of an investigation into judicial decisions about cases involving 
police officers implicated in deaths. The survey showed that  
155 Translated from French. “Depuis le début de son mandat, le Défenseur des droits a demandé l’engagement de poursuites disciplinaires dans 
36 dossiers. Or, aucune de ses demandes, pourtant rares et circonstanciées au regard du nombre de dossiers traités sur la même période (3987 
réclamations, soit 1%), n’a été suivie d’effet.” Defender of Rights, Annual Report for 2019, 8 June 2020, p.60.
156 I. Du Roy and L. Simbille, ‘Décès suite à une intervention policière: les deux-tiers des affaires ne débouchent sur aucun procès’, Bastamag, 16 July 
2020, https://www.bastamag.net/Violences-policieres-suivi-judiciaire-non-lieu-sans-suite-prison-impunite-IGPN, (accessed 2 August 2020). 
157 I. Du Roy and L. Simbille, ‘En quarante-trois ans, 676 morts à la suite d’interventions policières ou du fait d’un agent des forces de l’ordre’, Bastamag, 
https://bastamag.net/webdocs/police, (accessed 12 July 2020). 
between January 1977 and June 2020, out of 213 cases 
involving death for which the outcome of judicial decisions 
is publicly known (usually in the media), two thirds of them 
never resulted in a trial, the majority of cases being dismissed. 
Only 33% (one-third) of the cases went to trial (10% resulted 
in an acquittal, 18% in a suspended prison sentence, 5% in a 
prison sentence)156. 
Further Information about 
Non-Official Sources 
In addition to the data published by the IGPN, several groups 
of victims, NGOs, academic researchers and journalists 
have initiated a census based in particular on information 
communicated in the media. A notable example is the work 
of the Bastamag newspaper, which created in 2014 a database 
of cases of “deaths by the police”. Its results are presented on 
the newspaper’s website in the form of short analytical texts 
and numerous visual infographics157.
Bastamag records 676 deaths between January 1977 and 
December 2019. For each of these cases, the journalists 
processed and analysed several variables relating in particular 
to the dates and places of death, the biographical data of the 
deceased (age, sex) or the causes and circumstances of death 
(deaths by firearms, road accidents, “malaise or asphyxiation”, 
falls and drowning or by so-called “non-lethal” weapons). 
This database also provides information on the context in 
which the death occurred (death while fleeing from law 
enforcement agencies, following an arrest, in a police station 
or during a transfer), as well as on the police missions and 
units concerned (anti-terrorist operations, identity checks, 
response to a police call, response to a (suspected) crime in 
progress).  
Bastamag’s methodology is presented in detail. The journalists 
explain that they have included “all” cases of deaths involving 
police officers or gendarmes, including deaths involving 
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off-duty police officers. They mention their sources of 
information, which are diverse (press articles, archives, 
researchers, NGOs, families of deceased, lawyers etc.). 
The newspaper also provides transparency about the 
cases it reports. For each death recorded, the date, place, 
name and age of the person are mentioned (except when 
unknown), information that makes it possible to verify and 
cross-check the information if necessary. Based on this 
data, Bastamag recorded, from 2009 to 2019, between 10 
and 36 deaths each year. It recorded 28 deaths for the year 
2018 and 26 for 2019.  
158 Paul Le Derff is a researcher, a doctoral student in political science. Working with genealogical tools, he has tried to objectify the migratory 
origins of the victims based on their surnames. He concludes from his research that “while nearly one-third (30%) of victims are anonymous or 
have only a first name, there is a clear over-representation of foreign victims, immigrants or victims of immigrant origin (47.6%) compared to 
victims with no immigration connection or from overseas (22.4%). Victims of North African nationality or origin are the most numerous among 
victims of fatal police interventions (N=103, i.e. 27.8% of all victims and 39.8% of all victims whose origins are known)”. Translated from French: 
“S’il reste près d’un tiers (30%) de victimes anonymes ou dont on a seulement le prénom, une très nette surreprésentation de victimes étrangères, 
immigrées ou d’origine immigrée (47.6%) se dégage par rapport aux victimes sans lien avec l’immigration ou venant d’outre-mer (22.4%). Les 
victimes de nationalité ou d’origine maghrébine sont les plus nombreuses parmi les victimes d’interventions policières mortelles (N=103, soit 
27.8% de l’ensemble des victimes et 39.8% de l’ensemble des victimes dont les origines sont connues).” P. Le Derff, ‘Questionner l’origine 
migratoire des victimes d’interventions policières mortelles’, Médiapart, 19 February 2020, https://blogs.mediapart.fr/paul-le-derff/blog/190220/
questionner-l-origine-migratoire-des-victimes-d-interventions-policieres-mortelles, (accessed 2 September 2020).  
In addition, because of the legislation, no information 
on the ethnicity or migratory origin of the victims is 
recorded by the French authorities. However, the work of 
researchers provide some objective data. Based on a census 
of “fatal police interventions” that he carried out (using 
data from Bastamag in particular), Paul le Derff carried out 
an analysis of the migratory origin of the victims, which 
is an innovation on this subject. His work shows “a very 
clear over-representation of foreign victims, immigrants or 
victims of immigrant origin,” with victims of North African 
nationality or origin being the most numerous among the 
victims of fatal police interventions158.
Recommendations
The two French national forces (Police and Gendarmerie) are 
characterised by a profound lack of transparency. Very little 
information is provided to the public, either on cases  
of injuries and deaths, or on the disciplinary and judicial 
investigations and reviews following deaths. The institutions 
responsible for investigating cases involving the Police  
or Gendarmerie are also marked by a lack of hierarchical and 
institutional independence. We therefore make the following 
set of recommendations:   
1)  Although progress has been made by the 
National Police, which now publishes the number 
of “injuries and deaths” it registers each year, 
there is a need to improve the collection and 
publication of data. We recommend that:    
•  The national Police publish qualitative data on recorded 
cases of death (age, sex, place, date and circumstances of 
death; type of force used), in order to enable the use and 
analysis of this data (including by external bodies).
•  The national Gendarmerie develop a tool for registering 
injured and deceased persons and annually publish the  
data resulting from this census in a detailed manner  
(e.g. circumstances of death or injury, place where it 
occurred, demographic information such as age and sex  
of the deceased or injured, etc.).
2)  We also recommend that the data quality be 
improved through these measures:
•  The national Police should publish precise data on the 
methodology used for their “census of injured or dead 
individuals” and publicly specify, for example, the process 
according to which the database is populated, and the 
independent verifications conducted to monitor that 
process.
•  The national Gendarmerie should publicly specify what 
methodology will be used for the data collection to be 
put in place, as set out above (recommendation 1). The 
Gendarmerie should also detail what procedures will be 
used and what internal checks and controls will be carried 
out on data collection.  
3)  We recommend that steps be taken regarding 
data analysis and lessons learned:
•  The Police and Gendarmerie should use and analyse data 
on the use of force, including but not limited to, data on 
deaths and injuries, in order to generate evidence-based 
recommendations and to prevent future deaths. 
4)  Finally, it is necessary to guarantee the 
independence and transparency of investigations 
conducted by official agencies:
•  Investigations involving police officers or gendarmes, 
particularly in cases of death, must be conducted by  
a body with hierarchical, institutional, operational and  
legal independence;
•  The Ministry of the Interior must publish statistics on 
disciplinary proceedings against officers in cases relating to 
the use of force by the police and gendarmerie (including, 
but not limited to, cases in which a death has occurred). 
•  The Ministry of Justice must monitor and publish statistics 
on cases relating to the use of force by the police and 
gendarmerie (including, but not limited to, cases in which  
a death has occurred) in order to enable the monitoring  
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1.  Are the number of deaths following any police use of force (be it firearms, ‘less lethal’ weapons or other force): 
Collected? P
Publicly available? P
Is this a legal requirement? N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? G
2.  If published, to what extent is the number of deaths readily identifiable from official statistics? 
What work needs to be done to pull these out?
P
3. Are the deceased identified by name? N
4.  Is demographic and other information for the deceased (including ethnic background, age and gender):
Collected? N
Publicly available? N
Is this a legal requirement? N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? N
5. Is demographic and other information for LEOs:
Collected? N
Publicly available? N
Is this a legal requirement? N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? N
6. Is information on the circumstances:
Collected? G
Publicly available? P
Is this a legal requirement? P
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? P
7. Is information about the type(s) of force used:
Collected? G
Publicly available? G
Is this a legal requirement? N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? G
The Netherlands 
Data Quality of Official Sources
8. How reliable are the sources used to produce official statistics about deaths? P
9. Internal quality assurance / verification conducted G
10. Methodology for data collection publicly specified  G
11. How reliable are the overall figures produced? P
Data Analysis and Lessons Learnt
12. State / police agencies analyse data to generate evidence-based recommendations / lessons 
learnt, in order to prevent future deaths
P
13. Evidence that state / police agencies act on the results of their analysis, including applying 
lessons learnt
P
14. External bodies are able to reuse data for their own analyses P
15. External, non-governmental agencies collect, and are able to publish, their own statistics on 
deaths following police use of force
G
Investigations by Official Agencies
16. Is there a legal requirement for deaths to be independently investigated? G
17. Is there an authority, separate from the one involved in the incident, which conducts 
investigations into deaths? If so, which organisation(s) conduct these investigations?
Rijksrecherche
18. How independent are the investigations conducted by the organisation(s) named above? 
Please consider the extent to which they are independent and separate in terms of  
a) legal structure, b) hierarchy, c) investigative activity and personnel, d) operational ability  
(or ‘self-reliance’) e) oversight and control
G
19. Involvement of close relatives in the investigations L
20. Investigation reports into deaths are:
Publicly available? L
Do they give reasons for the conclusions they have reached? G
Is this a legal requirement? N
Can such information be requested from the authorities via FOI laws? G
21. Information available on legal proceedings against agents / officials pursuant to deaths P
22. Information available on legal proceedings against state agencies pursuant to deaths P
23. Information available on disciplinary proceedings against agents/ officials pursuant to deaths N
24. Number of prosecutions against agents / officials involved in the last ten years? N
25. Number of convictions against agents / officials involved in the last ten years? N
26. Number of prosecutions against agencies involved in the last ten years? L
27. Number of convictions against agencies involved in the last ten years? L










G L N UP
Data Collection and Publication by Official Agencies
Based on 2018 reporting period:
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The Netherlands is a geographically small coastal state 
with a high population density (over 17 million people live 
in area of 41,543 km2 for a density of 411.3 people/km2). 
Due to its colonial past and labour migration it has become 
an increasingly multicultural society. This has tested the 
country’s long established reputation as the epitome of a 
liberal political and cultural tradition, especially since the 
murder of the right-wing populist politician, Pim Fortuyn, 
by an environmental and animal rights activist in 2002 as 
well as the murder of the film maker Theo van Gogh by 
an Islamist militant in 2004159. Policing in the Netherlands 
was traditionally based on municipalities, but was reformed 
in the 1990s into 25 regional forces, with an additional 
national force providing services to regional forces and 
performing such tasks as diplomatic protection. Since 2013, 
a national police force has been formed. Throughout, a 
basic dual accountability has been in place: on the one 
hand, the police are responsible to the mayor of the 
municipalities in which they operate for public order and 
providing general assistance, but criminal investigation is  
the province of the public prosecutor.
Dutch police officers are routinely armed, each with a 
sidearm (in addition to a short baton and pepper spray). 
The police are not the only organisation fulfilling policing 
functions that carry firearms160. As no members of any of 
these organisations have been involved in any deaths in the 
last twenty years, they will not be dealt with in the rest of 
this report.
159 P.A.J. Waddington et al., ‘Singing the same tune? International continuities and discontinuities in how police talk about using force’, Crime, Law 
and Social Change, vol. 52, no. 2, 2009, pp.111-138.
160 The relevant organisations are: Royal Marechaussee KMAR (some 5700 officers), a police organisation responsible for police functions with 
regard to the military that according to the Police Law also fulfils a police function by providing security for airports, royal palaces, the Dutch 
national bank and important persons (as well as Dutch embassies in risk areas abroad). The KMAR can also provide support to the Dutch police 
and serves as a strategic reserve for it. Around 3,000 customs officers, some 400 forest and game wardens and officers in the state criminal 
investigations department also carry firearms.
161 Since 2014, before which date they carried a Walther P5.
162 http://politieparcours.eu/home/page%204%20politiemunitie.html, http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2009/10/07/the-9x19mm-np-
netherlands-police and https://www.ruag.com/sites/default/files/media_document/2017-01/9x19_Deformation_Ammunition_en_low.pdf,  
(accessed 27 October 2020).
163 http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0006589/2017-01-01
164 It should be borne in mind that the Dutch word for ‘force’ in the use of force is ‘violence’ (geweld).
Police and firearms in the Netherlands:  
rules and regulations
Dutch police officers (numbering 51,442 in 2015) routinely 
carry a Walther P99 firearm161. More important than the 
firearm is the type of ammunition used, as this determines 
the seriousness of any injuries caused by projectile impact. 
Since 2011, the Dutch police use Action NP ammunition 
(the NP stands for Netherlands Police), representing the 
choice made with regard to the balance between stopping 
power considered necessary and the prevention of 
wounding considered excessive162.
The use of the firearm is regulated (as are all police uses of 
force) by Article 11 of the Constitution (Grondwet), which 
mentions the inviolable rights of physical integrity of the 
body, and Article 7.1 of the Police Law 2012 (Politiewet 
2012). In addition to these laws, there is a national official 
instruction on the use of force (Ambtsinstructie 1994163), 
as stipulated in Article 9 of the Police Law. Article 7.1 
of the Police Law 2012 stipulates that police officers are 
authorized to use force164, when the intended goal justifies 
this (paying attention to the dangers inherent in the use of 
force) and the goal cannot be achieved by other means. If 
possible, a warning should be given before any use of force. 
The exercise of authority to use force has to be reasonable 
and measured in relation to the intended goal (principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality).
Articles 8 & 9 provide specific regulations for the use of 
automatic or sharpshooter rifles by special units. In 1989, one 
death occurred as a result of the use of such a weapon, but 
no other instances have occurred since then165 In a specific 
regulation (RTGP), training requirements for all police officers 
are set out. The National Regulation on Police Weapons 
and Equipment (Bewapenings – en uitrustingsregeling 2012)166 
stipulates what weapons and equipment may be carried by 
specific types of officers. 
Data Collection and Publication 
by Official Agencies 
The number of deaths following police use of force is not 
recorded. The public prosecutor’s office publishes a yearly 
list of incidents involving the use of a firearm that have been 
investigated by the Rijksrecherche167 and how many deaths 
have resulted following police use of a firearm (in 2018, 27 
shooting incidents were investigated that resulted in 3 deaths, 
which equals the average number of people dying each year 
as a result of police use of firearms168). There is no publication 
of the number of deaths following other types of police use 
of force (or deaths in police custody). As far as is known, 
these data are not collected169. There is no legal requirement 
to collect or publish these data. The information could in 
principle be requested from authorities via FOI laws, but it is 
not the case that for each and every case any single authority 
would be in possession of all relevant data. In individual cases 
the public prosecutor’s office publishes a press release after 
an investigation has been concluded and a decision with 
regard to prosecution of the officer has been taken.
No extra work is required to establish the number of deaths 
following use of a firearm. Establishing deaths following other 
use of force / in custody deaths requires extensive work 
165 After the 2001 September 11 attacks in the US, one of the police unions called for an extension of the circumstances in which force could be used 
to fight terrorism, but this was felt to be unnecessary, as existing regulations were considered to be flexible enough to deal with this. What did occur 
was a reorganisation of SWAT-teams to be better prepared to deal with terrorism-related incidents. Since 2006 a Special Interventions Unit exists to 
deal with terrorist incidents.  
166 This combined and replaced two previously existing regulations: the Bewapeningsregeling 1994 and the Uitrustingsregeling 2012.
167 The Rijksrecherche falls under the jurisdiction of the public prosecutor’s office and is not part of the police.
168 https://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuws/2020/05/11/rijksrecherche-onderzocht-16-schietincidenten-in-2019, (accessed 27 October 2020).
169 Following publications by NGO ControleAltDelete (see below), the police recently announced that they will in future publish these data.
170 The officer reports the use of force to a supervising officer, who makes up a written report.
encompassing going through press releases or court records. 
On no occasion are the deceased identified by name by the 
authorities.
Demographic and other information on deceased individuals 
is not collected or published by the authorities. Due to 
privacy considerations, it is unlikely that information requests 
via FOI laws would yield this type of information.
Demographics and other information on police officers is 
not collected or made available. As their privacy is protected, 
details about them are not provided in press releases or 
judicial proceedings. When they testify their anonymity is 
ensured. On some occasions, officers have at some point 
(after all legal proceedings had ended) spoken out publicly 
and talked about the huge impact the incident had had upon 
themselves, both in their personal lives and career wise.
Information on the circumstances in which a death occurs 
are certainly part of the investigation conducted by the  
Rijksrecherche. The summary published after the investigation 
has been concluded contains information about the 
circumstances, but the amount of detail differs considerably 
from case to case. There is no legal requirement to publish 
this information. Only if a case is brought before a judge 
(a rare occurrence) would more details become publicly 
available.
Information about the type of force used in general is 
collected and registered by the police, which is a legal 
requirement170. In principle, the consequences for the citizen 
are also registered, but this is not always known at the 
time the registration is made. On a yearly basis, the police 
publish an overview of the number of incidents police used 
force and of the types of force being used. This is not a legal 
requirement and in the past this information was regularly 
requested by the media using FOI laws.
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Data Quality 
Data on the number of deaths as a result of police use 
of a firearm is 100% reliable. As all deaths as a result of 
police use of force are investigated by the same institution 
(Rijksrecherche) and as the number of deaths (including 
deaths as a result of other uses of force and deaths in 
custody) rarely if ever rises above 10 per year171, there are 
no methodological issues (other than the lack of data on 
deaths not caused by use of a firearm). The issues instead 
pertain to the lack of information available.
Data Analysis and Lessons 
Learnt
Over the past decades the Dutch police has commissioned 
a large number of independent studies into police use  
of force, including police use of firearms. These studies  
have been used explicitly to change the Ambtsinstructie, 
to adjust training in the use of force and to make 
decisions about (the need to) acquire new weapons. 
This does not imply that recommendations from these 
studies are always acted upon. For these studies, police 
data and Rijksrecherche data have been made available 
to researchers172. In recent years, after the formation of 
a national police force, police also carry out their own 
(limited) analyses of use of force data173. Since 2019, a 
conscious attempt is being made to decouple accountability 
procedures from learning processes.
171 Adang (in preparation).
172 E.g. O. Adang and J. Timmer, Beheersing van gevaar. Praktijkboek voor de opleiding van vuurwapendragenden en de toetsing van geweldstoepassing. 
Derde, herziene druk, The Hague, Elsevier Overheid, 2005; O. Adang, B. Mali and J. Timmer, ‘Politiegeweld in zicht: zijn nieuwe geweldsmiddelen 
nodig?’ Tijdschrift voor de Politie, vol. 219, no. 1, 2019, pp.22-26; J. Naeyé, Niet zonder slag of stoot. De geweldsbevoegdheid en doorzettingskracht 
van de Nederlandse politie, Kerckebosch, Zeist, 2005; J. Timmer, J. Naeyé and M. van der Steeg, Onder schot: Vuurwapengebruik van de politie in 
Nederland (1978-1995), Deventer, Gouda Quint, 1996; J. Timmer, Politiegeweld: Geweldgebruik van en tegen de politie in Nederland, Alphen aan 
den Rijn, Kluwer, 2005; J.S. Timmer and R.S.M. Visser (eds.), Gepast geweld. Geweld van en tegen de politie in 2010, Amsterdam, Centrum voor 
Politiewetenschappen Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2015.
173 For figures on police use of force in 2018 see https://www.politie.nl/nieuws/2019/maart/28/00-lichte-daling-in-cijfers-politiegeweld.html, 
(accessed 27 October 2020).
174 Public prosecution service at a glance, 2011, p.26. The procedure was adopted following a verdict from the ECtHR that the procedure followed 
before was in some respects insufficiently independent and effective and a violation of Article 2 ECHR: Ramsahai v The Netherlands, 15 May 2007 
(Application no. 52391/99), § 321, https://zembla.bnnvara.nl/data/files/1918355397.pdf, (accessed 27 October 2020).
175 Although the term “Rijksrecherche” is translated in this brochure as the Police Internal Investigations Department, as mentioned earlier, it 
falls in fact under the jurisdiction of the public prosecutor’s office and is not part of the police. A better translation would be State Criminal 
Investigations Department. The ECHR has determined that it is sufficiently independent of the police.
Investigations by Official 
Agencies   
Article 17 of the Ambtsinstructie 1994 stipulates that the 
commanding officer has to be notified of any use of force 
immediately. The commanding officer is the one who then 
prepares the use-of-force report. In specific cases (such as 
when shots have been fired or someone has died) the chief 
of police is required to inform the public prosecutor of the 
use of force. The binding “Procedure after serious incidents 
involving police use of force” will be followed174. The public 
prosecutor’s office describes the procedure as follows in a 
2011 brochure (published in English):
If civilians are seriously injured or die after a police 
use of force, the National Police Internal Investigations 
Department175 (Rijksrecherche) will investigate under 
the supervision of a public prosecutor. To this purpose, 
the department has a quick response team to start 
an investigation whenever such an incident occurs. 
According to the serious incidents procedure, the 
police are required to report the incident to the 
public prosecutor, who will contact the internal 
investigations department. A coordinator from the 
internal investigations department will be appointed who 
will contact the police force involved and explain the 
internal investigation procedure to the officer involved. 
In principle, the officer involved should be interviewed 
within 24 hours. The investigation will be supervised by 
a public prosecutor, who, for reasons of objectivity, may 
not be the prosecutor responsible for the area where the 
incident took place. Members of support services taking 
part in the investigation (e.g., forensic detectives) may not 
be connected to those involved in the incident.  
All those involved will be interviewed by the internal 
investigations department. In a meeting with forensic experts 
and the public prosecutor, a decision is made about which 
forensic data will and will not be investigated. In case of death, 
an autopsy is performed on the body of the deceased. In 
complex cases a video reconstruction is made in the presence 
of the examining magistrate and lawyers involved.  
Investigations by the internal investigations department 
should be concluded within six weeks but sometimes take 
longer. The department sends its report to the chief public 
prosecutor who will decide whether or not the use of force 
was lawful. The chief public prosecutor will usually ask for and 
receive non-binding advice from the Advisory Committee on 
Police Use of Firearms (composed of some chief prosecutors, 
an officer specialised in investigations, the coordinating officer 
from the internal investigations department and a chief 
advocate general). According to a binding protocol, police 
officers will be interviewed in the first instance as witnesses, 
and not as suspects.
As a result of the investigation, the chief public prosecutor 
decides whether or not to prosecute the police officer(s) 
who used the force that caused the death. When the relatives 
of the deceased (as directly interested parties) do not agree 
with this decision, they can petition the Court of Appeals 
(Gerechtshof) to order the public prosecutor to prosecute  
the officer(s) involved (Article 12 procedure176). If the court 
rules favourably on their complaint, a trial will follow. If the 
court agrees with the prosecutor that a prosecution is not 
called for, family members may petition the ECtHR to take up 
their case.
As far as transparency is concerned, in most cases, the public 
prosecutor brings out a press release following his decision 
whether or not to prosecute the officers involved. 
176 Contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
177 M. Glismeijer, De beklagprocedure van artikel 12 Sv bij het niet vervolgen van politiegeweld door het Openbaar Ministerie, Masterscriptie Strafrecht, 
Universiteit van Utrecht, 2015.
178 In Dutch: ‘doodslag’.
179 M. van der Steeg, ‘Politieschutter voor de rechter’, Tijdschrift Praktijkwijzer Strafrecht, vol.43, 2016, pp.1-17.
The press release usually contains a (very brief) summary of 
the findings of the internal investigations department. This 
means that in cases where there is no prosecution (i.e. in 
almost all cases) there is very little public information about 
what happened. Relatives may receive (through their lawyers) 
more extensive results of the investigation, but these are 
not made public (unless the lawyer decides to go public with 
part of the findings). If the relatives decide to file a complaint 
with the Court of Appeals, most of the motivated decisions 
are published online at rechtspraak.nl). In general, only a 
selection of court cases is published in this way. In special 
cases, an independent public investigation (separate from the 
criminal investigation performed by the internal investigations 
department) is carried out.
Glismeijer studied the Article 12 complaints procedure with 
the Court of Appeals, based on 6 complaints filed between 
2012 and 2015 with regard to use of the firearm by a police 
officer (two with a deadly result) and concluded that it is not 
always clear from the court’s decision (disposition) whether 
or not the investigation was carried out in an independent, 
impartial and effective way. This is important because the 
Article 12 procedure is intended to bolster the confidence of 
civilians in the judicial process and to prevent arbitrariness in 
the prosecution policy of the public prosecutor177.
Van der Steeg, a lawyer for police officers, studied 23 cases 
in which police officers who had fired shots (three of which 
resulted in death) were prosecuted between 2000-2015.  
The 23 officers acted in 21 incidents, nine of them were 
convicted (mostly for manslaughter178). She notes that in  
most cases where police officers used their firearm, they are 
not prosecuted. It is clear according to Van der Steeg that 
judges and prosecutors take the special position of police 
officers into account with regard to their duty to act in 
specific situations (Garantenstellung) or the proportionality 
of their actions in a self-defence situation. She notes 
nevertheless that the number of prosecutions and convictions 
increased considerably over the last three years of her study 
(2013-2015)179.
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Non-official Sources  
and Analysis
There is one NGO, ControleAltDelete, that consistently 
draws attention to police use of force and ethnic profiling 
by police. For 2016 and 2017 they compiled a list of 
individuals that died as a result of police use of force or in 
police custody (7 in 2016, 9 in 2017; 6 of the total of 16 
as a result of police use of a firearm)180. The Dutch section 
of Amnesty International on occasion draws attention to 
issues with police use of force and ethnic profiling by police 
in the Netherlands, but they do not compile lists on deaths 
as a result of police use of force.
Newspapers occasionally pay attention to the topic  
after (a controversy around) a death occurred and then 
sometimes include a list (e.g. examples of alleged “suicide 
by cop”), but no systematic analysis has been produced.  
180 https://controlealtdelete.nl/blog/bijna-3-keer-meer-politiedoden-dan-bekend, (accessed 27 October 2020).
Recommendations
As of July 2020, the way in which officers in the Netherlands 
need to report on the use of force and the way use of force 
is judged have changed considerably, a conscious attempt to 
decouple accountability procedures from learning processes.
These changes aim to increase the learning potential of the 
police organisation, to clarify the position of officers that  
used force, to treat them in principle as professionals 
(meaning that only in exceptional cases resulting in death or 
serious injury will the full spectrum of judicial review take 
place), to support officers and to be more transparent to the 
public. Given that these reporting changes have only come 
in recently, it remains to be seen how well these aims will be 
achieved. The changes do not affect the independent way in 
which incidents that result in death are investigated and dealt 
with (as described above).
Information about the type of force used by police in the 
Netherlands is collected and registered by the police.  This is 
a legal requirement. On a yearly basis, the police publish an 
overview of the number of incidents police used force and 
of the types of force being used. Publishing this overview, 
however, is not a legal requirement.
The Netherlands has a clear procedure for the independent 
investigation of deaths of individuals who were subjected 
to use of force by police or who died while under control 
of the police. However, there is limited public information 
available about these investigations. The public prosecutor’s 
office publishes a yearly list of incidents involving the use of 
a firearm that have been investigated and how many deaths 
have resulted following police use of a firearm. There is no 
publication of the number of deaths following other types 
of police use of force (or of deaths in police custody). In 
individual cases (especially high profile cases that received a 
lot of media attention) the public prosecutor’s office publishes 
a press release after an investigation has been concluded and 
a decision with regard to prosecution of the officer has been 
taken, summarising the findings of the investigation and the 
reasons for the prosecutorial decision. The amount of detail 
provided on the circumstances in which a death occurs differs 
considerably from case to case. There is no legal requirement 
to publish this information. This means that in cases where 
there is no prosecution (in other words, in almost all cases) 
there is very little public information about what happened. 
Relatives of the deceased may receive (through their lawyers) 
more extensive results of the investigation, but these are not 
made public (unless the lawyer decides to go public with part 
of the findings). If the relatives decide to file a complaint with 
the Court of Appeals, its (reasoned) decisions will most likely 
be published online.
In light of the points above, transparency 
associated with the use of force in the Netherlands 
should be increased. In particular, we recommend 
that:
1)  To enhance data collection and publication
•  It should be standard practice to make publicly available 
information on each death that resulted after police use 
of force (any type of force, not just use of a firearm) 
and after each death in custody. This information should 
include details about the circumstances in which the death 
occurred (while respecting privacy of both the deceased 
and the police officers involved), the review process that 
has taken place and any measures that have been taken or 
lessons that have been drawn.
2)  To enhance data quality
•  The type of data that needs to be collected systematically 
and maintained on any death resulting after police use of 
force or after an in-custody death needs to be clarified 
and coordinated between institutions involved (police, 
Rijkrecherche, public prosecutor, court decisions).
3)  To enhance data analysis, investigations and  
lessons learned
•  Instead of on an ad hoc basis as is the case now, 
accumulated data on deaths that resulted after police use 
of force or after in-custody deaths should be analysed by 


























58   Police Lethal Force and Accountability  59 
Contributors  
Otto Adang is a behavioural scientist and Professor by 
Special Appointment of Security and Collective Behaviour 
at the Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences at 
the University of Groningen. He also holds a chair in 
Public Order Management at the Police Academy of the 
Netherlands since 2004. Adang is interested in aggression, 
reconciliation and collective behaviour in relation to 
public order enforcement. Since 1998, he has also led 
the research programme Managing Dangerous Conflict 
Situations, which focuses on the interaction between police 
and citizens. He has published numerous papers and books 
on police use of force issues.
Aline Daillère is an independent researcher. A lawyer 
by training, specialised in the field of human rights, she 
previously worked for French NGOs (La Cimade, ACAT). 
She is now preparing a PhD in political science on police 
fining practices at the University of Versailles-Saint-Quentin 
(France). Her research interests are the use of force by 
the police, policing of assemblies and the judicial and 
disciplinary control of police activities. She is the author 
of L’ordre et la force. Enquête sur l’usage de la force par les 
représentants de la loi en France181 and of the report Affaire 
Ali Ziri, autopsie d’une enquête judiciaire182, published by 
ACAT in 2016 and 2017.
Jasper De Paepe is a PhD fellow and researcher in the 
research group ‘Governing & Policing Security’ (GaPS) in 
the Department of Public Governance & Management 
at Ghent University. His main research interest is in the 
management of police innovation and change.
Abi Dymond is a Senior Lecturer in Criminology at the 
University of Exeter and previously worked for a range 
of UK NGOs, including the Omega Research Foundation 
where she focused on police use of force and human rights. 
Her current research interests and impact work focus on 
the use of less lethal weapons by the police and in places 
of detention. She received the ESRC Impact Prize in 2018 
for her work on the new police use of force reporting 
requirement in England and Wales that is discussed 
throughout the report.  
181 ‘Order and force. Survey on the use of force by law enforcement officials in France’.
182 ‘Ali Ziri case, autopsy of a judicial enquiry’.
Marleen Easton is Professor and chair of the research 
group ‘Governing & Policing Security’ in the Department 
of Public Governance & Management at Ghent University. 
She has twenty years of experience conducting qualitative, 
empirical research on policing and security related topics. 
Since 2014 she is president of the Belgian Innovation 
Centre for Security (IUNGOS). Since 2017 she is adjunct 
professor at the Griffith Criminology Institute participating 
in the Evolving Security Initiative by running its Ghent hub 
(ESI@GNE).  
Brian Rappert is a Professor of Science, Technology and 
Public Affairs at the University of Exeter. His long-term 
interest has been the examination of the disclosure and 
concealment of information in situations characterised by 
uncertainty and disagreement. His books include Controlling 
the Weapons of War; Biotechnology, Security and the Search 
for Limits; How to Look Good in a War and The Dis-eases  
of Secrecy. 
Stephen Skinner is a Professor of Comparative Legal 
History and Legal Theory at the University of Exeter 
and Director of Exeter Law School’s Human Rights and 
Democracy Forum. His research is mainly focused on 
questions of state power and criminal law in democratic 
and non-democratic systems; and the application of 
the Right to Life under Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights to police uses of lethal and 
life-threatening force. His publications include a recent 
monograph entitled Lethal Force, the Right to Life and the 














60   Police Lethal Force and Accountability  61 
62   Police Lethal Force and Accountability  63 
20
20
SS
IS
01
8
